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Amy Salyzyn*

The Judicial Regulation of Lawyers
in Canada

The question of whether Canadian lawyers ought to be trusted to govern
themselves has been repeatedly raised by the public, policy-makers and the
academy over the past several decades. The legal profession has responded
on a number of fronts, adopting what has been characterized as a "regime
of defensive self-regulation." The analysis in this article complements and
complicates this account by arguing that, alongside the profession's efforts at
defensive self-regulation, there has been a steady stream of aggressive judicial
regulation. The central argument of this article is two-fold: first, that courts have
come to occupy an increasingly active role as regulators of the Canadian legal
profession in the past several decades; and, second, that the measures taken
by the courts have resulted in a regulatory regime more attentive to the public
interest. In advancing these arguments, this article seeks not only to present a
more accurate picture of the current status of lawyer regulation in Canada but also
to provide a better foundation from which to discuss future reforms.

Au cours des dernieres decennies, la question de savoir s'il faut faire confiance
aux avocats canadiens et croire qu'ils peuvent sautogouverner a ete soulevee
par le public, par les decideurs politiques et par des universitaires. Le corps
juridique a repondu sur plusieurs fronts et adopte ce qui a ete qualifie de
, regime d'autoreglementation defensive .. Lanalyse proposee dans cet article
vient parfaire et compliquer cette affirmation. En effet, I'auteure avance que le
travail d'autoreglementation defensive de la profession a continuellement ete
accompagne par une reglementation judiciaire rigoureuse. L'argument central
de Iarticle comporte deux volets : premierement, au cours des dernieres
decennies, les tribunaux en sont venus a jouer un r6le de plus en plus actif en
tant qu'organismes de reglementation de la profession juridique au Canada et,
deuxiemement, les mesures prises par les tribunaux ont amene la mise en place
d'un regime reglementaire plus soucieux de 'intert public. En avangant ces
arguments, I'auteure cherche non seulement a presenter un tableau relativement
precis du statut actuel de la reglementation a laquelle les avocats sont assujettis
au Canada, mais egalement a proposer une base plus solide qui servira de point
de depart pour discuter des futures reformes.

*
Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law. Special thanks to Jena McGill as well
as the anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful feedback on drafts of this piece.
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Introduction
This article traces developments in lawyer regulation in Canada over the
last forty years, with a focus on the judicial regulation of lawyers. The role
that judges play in regulating Canadian lawyers has not, to date, been the
subject of extended and detailed scholarly analysis. This is a gap that needs
to be filled. In the absence of a systematic analysis of judicial regulation
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in Canada, we lack a complete picture of the current regulatory landscape
governing this country's legal profession and how it came to be. Having
this more complete picture in hand is essential in considering the best way
forward in regulating Canadian lawyers.
The question of whether Canadian lawyers ought to be trusted to
govern themselves has been repeatedly raised by the public, policy-makers
and the academy over the past several decades. The legal profession has
responded on a number of fronts, adopting what has been characterized
as a "regime of defensive self-regulation." 1 The analysis in this article
complements and complicates this account by arguing that, alongside the
profession's efforts at defensive self-regulation, there has been a steady
stream of aggressive judicial regulation. The central argument of this
article is two-fold: first, that courts have come to occupy an increasingly
active role as regulators of the Canadian legal profession in the past
several decades; and, second, that the measures taken by the courts have
resulted in a regulatory regime more attentive to the public interest. In
advancing these arguments, this article seeks not only to present a more
accurate picture of the current status of lawyer regulation in Canada but
also to provide a better foundation from which to discuss future reforms.
Much ofthe current attention given to how the Canadian legal profession
is regulated is a result of moves away from lawyer self-regulation in other
common law jurisdictions. Reforms in these jurisdictions-most notably,
Australia and England and Wales-have prompted self-reflection in
Canada and raised a number of important questions. Why haven't we seen
similar changes in Canada? Should Canada head in the same direction as
other countries? The account that this article provides of the emergence
of aggressive judicial regulation helps to direct our consideration of these
questions in several important respects. First, it clearly and methodically
demonstrates that the profession's claim to self-regulation is highly
attenuated. As will be explored in detail below, judges have powerfully
inserted themselves in all of the areas considered to be constitutive of
self-regulation and have done so in a manner that has advanced the public
interest. This observation seriously undermines any sort of blanket claim

1. This term finds its source in Richard Devlin & Albert Cheng, "Re-calibrating, re-visioning and
rethinking self-regulation in Canada" (2010) 17:3 Int'l J L Prof 233. I use this term in a manner
consistent with Devlin and Cheng, namely, to label the "increasingly muscular approach to the
regulation of the legal profession" taken by Canadian law societies (at 234) and I rely on some of these
authors' observations. As my review of the regulatory environment extends to an earlier time period
than that addressed by Devlin and Cheng, however, I also use this term to describe developments that
precede the activity discussed in their paper.
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that the public interest requires Canadian lawyers to have independence
from external control.
Second, the analysis here also calls into question the assumption
advanced via the "lawyer-judge bias" theory that judges, by virtue of
being former lawyers, are inherently deficient regulators of lawyers who
will inevitably favour the interests of their former colleagues at every
turn.2 To the contrary, a close and careful look at judicial regulation reveals
that measures taken by Canadian courts have repeatedly promoted the
public interest over the interests of the profession. This suggests that any
discussion of regulatory reform should not focus exclusively on a binary
weighting of governmental control versus professional self-control but
also include the judiciary as a major and helpful regulatory player.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I covers off some preliminary
issues, outlining in more detail the nature of the "lawyer-judge bias" theory
that has been advanced and discussing how several key concepts-namely
self-regulation, judicial regulation, and public interest-are defined and
used in this article. Part II briefly touches on the political background for
the judicial regulatory measures discussed, with particular attention to
a series of governmental inquiries beginning in the 1970s that served to
sharpen public scrutiny of the legal profession. Parts III and IV form the
heart of the article and make the case that a regime of aggressive judicial
regulation has emerged alongside the profession's defensive efforts.
Part III focuses on developments in judicial regulation of the practice
of law and, in particular, regulation relating to the post-entry competence
of lawyers. Beginning in the late 1970s, courts established themselves as
aggressive co-regulators in this area through their administration of civil
actions in negligence. In a series of decisions, courts rejected exceptional
treatment for lawyers in relation to negligence claims. The scope of liability
faced by lawyers in negligence was also expanded in certain areas.
Part IV takes up the judicial regulation of the business of law and
canvasses measures taken in relation to (1) entry restrictions; (2) postentry limits on competition (in particular, in the areas of advertising,
fees, and unauthorized practice of law); and (3) post-entry conduct rules
(specifically relating to conflicts of interest and lawyer withdrawals from
the record). In each of these areas, courts have taken measures that have
favoured the public interest over the self-interest of the profession and, in

2.

The term "lawyer-judge bias" is taken from Benjamin H Barton, The Lawyer-JudgeBias in the

American Legal System (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Barton has been a leading
proponent of this theory in the context of the American legal system.
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some cases, directly rejected contemporaneous standards adopted by the
legal profession itself
I. A theory and some definitions
As noted above, this article is not only concerned with documenting the
various measures taken by courts in recent decades with respect to the
lawyer regulation, but also considers the consequences of these measures.
In order to set the stage for this critical analysis, this Part introduces the
"lawyer-judge bias" theory and discusses how several key concepts-selfregulation, judicial regulation, and public interest-are understood and
used in the arguments developed in this article.
1. Lawyer-judge bias
To the extent that judges have been recognized as regulators of the legal
profession, their ability to effectively regulate lawyers has come into
question. More specifically, judges, as former lawyers, are often viewed
as lacking the distance or motivation to fairly regulate "their own." The
specific term "lawyer-judge bias" is taken from the work of Benjamin
Barton who has laid out a detailed case that, in the American context,
"lawyer-judges instinctively favor the legal profession in their decisions
and actions and that this bias has powerful and far-reaching effects." 3 In
short, he posits, "when given the chance, judges favor the interests of the
legal profession over the public."4 This bias, according to Barton, is based
on the fact that "regardless of political affiliation, judicial philosophy, race,
gender or religion, every American judge shares a single characteristic:
every American judge is a former lawyer."5 Canadian judges, of course,
share this same characteristic, which invites an application of this theory to
Canada. Although American judges possess different powers in regulating
lawyers than do Canadian judges,6 one can find similar concerns regarding

3.
4.
5.

Ibid at 2.
Ibid.
Ibid at 3.

6.
For a more detailed account of the role that American judges play in regulating American
lawyers, see, e.g., Fred C Zacharias, "Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers" (2009) 70 Ohio
St LJ 73.
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judicial sympathy to the legal profession's interests expressed in the
Canadian context.7
This article explores the applicability of the "lawyer-judge bias"
theory to the Canadian context. It is argued that, in Canada, experience
has shown that courts will not inevitably favour the interests of the legal
profession over those of the public. To the contrary, judges have taken
repeated measures that have favoured the public interest at the expense of
the legal profession's self-interest.
2. Self-regulation
The definition of "self-regulation" is neither self-evident nor
uncontroversial. 8 This article proceeds by relying on a definition of selfregulation consistent with that provided by Tanina Rostain, who describes
self-regulation as "encompass[ing] the authority to delineate a sphere of
expertise, establish qualifications for membership, limit competition from'9
non-members, and impose ethical rules of conduct on practitioners. "
Drawing from this explanation, self-regulation is defined for the purposes
of this article in terms of control over four core regulatory areas: entry,
competition, competence, and conduct.
The first of the two interrelated arguments developed in this articlethat courts have occupied an increasingly active role as regulators of the
legal profession in the past several decades-is rooted in the observation
that significant judicial measures have been taken in each of these four
core areas. Part III below examines measures taken with respect to postentry competence, while Part IV takes up entry restrictions, post-entry
limits on competition, and post-entry conduct rules. The analysis in these
parts reveals that, notwithstanding the fact that law societies are still
powerful regulators in Canada, their authority is far from exclusive or
even dominant in core areas.
7.
As stated by Adam Dodek in "Lawyers, Guns, and Money: Lawyers and Power in Canadian
Society" in David L Blaikie et al, eds, Why Good LawyersMatter (Toronto: IrwinLaw, 2012) 57 at 62:
It is an obvious but important point that all judges are drawn from the ranks of lawyers.
Most judges are persons who practiced law for twenty to thirty years. They are steeped in
the culture of the law and of the legal profession. They may be expected to be sympathetic
to and supportive of the existing structures of power from whence they came.
See also, Richard F Devlin & Porter Heffernan, "The End(s) of Self-Regulation?" (2008) 45 Alta L
Rev 169 at 208.
8. Indeed, some commentators proceed-in a manner that I reject-by characterizing judicial
involvement in lawyer regulation as a form of self-regulation because judges are lawyers (or former
lawyers). For further discussion, see, e.g., Fred Zacharias, "The Myth of Self-Regulation" (2009) 93
MinnL Rev 1147 at 1153.
9. Tanina Rostain, "Self-Regulatory Authority, Markets, and the Ideology of Professionalism," in
Robert Baldwin et al, eds, The Oxford HandbookofRegulation (New York: Oxford University Press,
2010) 169 at 169.
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3. The public interest
Key to the arguments advanced in this article is the concept of the
public interest. For the purposes of this article, the premise that judicial
regulation has been attentive to the public interest is framed in terms of
judicial actions taken to counteract or mitigate abuses associated with selfgoverning powers. As observed by Michael J.Trebilcock:
one of the principal social risks involved in delegated forms of
regulation is that the profession in question may be tempted to abuse
its self-governing powers to engage in anti-social forms of collusion or
cartelization, e.g. by restrictingentry unnecessarily,or by constraining
unnecessarily post-entry forms of consumer welfare enhancing
behaviour (e.g. advertising, broader utilization of para-professionals),
or by insufficiently zealous monitoring of post-entry competence (as
opposed to dishonesty or unethical conduct).
To the above list, I would add: adopting conduct rules that unduly favour
the commercial interests of the profession. With this list, each of the four
core areas of control constitutive of self-regulation may be understood as
carrying an attendant risk:
(1) Entry: Unnecessary entrance restrictions,
(2) Competence: Insufficiently zealous monitoring of post-entry
competence,
(3) Competition: Unnecessary constraints on post-entry forms of
consumer enhancing behaviour, and
(4) Conduct: Adopting conduct rules that unduly favour the
commercial interests of the profession.
The argument advanced in this article is that judges have come to
occupy an important regulatory role by acting to mitigate these risks. In
some cases this has involved rejection of the self-interested standards or
positions adopted by the legal profession. In other cases, this has involved
courts more actively regulating themselves in a certain area.
The use of this framework to discuss the public interest is not intended
to preclude a more expansive and sophisticated definition of this term that
would, for example, recognize an inherent value in having members of the
public participate in the governance of the legal profession or suggest that
acting in the public interest is the legal profession's self-interest, properly
understood. The argument here is consciously modest: in taking actions
that counteract identified "anti-social" behaviours or risks associated
with a self-regulating legal profession, judges have regulated the legal
10. Michael J Trebilcock, "Critical Issues in the Design of Governance Regimes for the Professions"
(1989) 23 Law Society Gazette 349 at 350-351 [emphasis added].
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profession in a manner that has promoted the public interest over interests
of the profession, narrowly understood.
4. Judicial regulation
As a final introductory matter, the term "judicial regulation" deserves
some consideration. The use of this term here is broad and is intended to
encompass a wide range of measures taken by courts that have a bearing
on the governance of the legal profession and the behaviour of lawyers.
Such measures would include not only those traditionally viewed as within
the ambit of judicial regulation of lawyers-for example, the court's
exercise of its statutory and inherent jurisdiction over court processes and
its administration of civil causes of action-but also judicial interpretation
and application of legislation affecting lawyer governance or behaviour.
The latter category includes, for example, court decisions involving
provincial and territorial legislation delegating governing authority to the
law societies as well as legislation of more general application, such as the
CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms11 and federal competition law12
to the legal profession.
II. The political background: a series of inquiries
The judicial measures traced in this article begin in the 1970s, a period
characterized by intensified public scrutiny of the Canadian legal
profession. To be sure, prior to this decade, lawyers in Canada faced (as
they continue to face) an "endemic unpopularity" with the public similar to
that experienced by their peers in other countries.13 Canadian lawyers were
also, throughout the twentieth century, forced to grapple with a number
of governmental challenges to their claims to self-regulation. 14 Although
skepticism of the legal profession was nothing new, the 1970s brought
sharpened focus to the principle of public accountability.15 This focus
on public accountability, with the concept of protecting and furthering

11.
CanadianCharterofRights andFreedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c I1.
12. See, e.g., the Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34 and its predecessors.

13. For evidence of some of this earlier criticism, see, e.g., PJ Giffen, "Social Control and
Professional Self-Government: A Study of the Legal Profession in Canada" in SD Clark, ed, Urbanism
and the Changing CanadianSociety (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961) at 117.
14. Ibid at 131 and generally. In this chapter, Giffen traces some of the major challenges that the

legal profession in Canada faced from the 1920s to 1960s to its authority to self-regulate and also
reviews some of the defensive measures taken by the law societies including the establishment of
"reimbursement funds" to compensate clients for financial losses suffered as a result of defaulting
solicitors, the organization of legal aid programs, and the development of public relations programs.
15. Harry W Athurs "Public Accountability of the Legal Profession" in Philip A Thomas, ed, Law
in the Balance: Legal Services in the 1980s (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982) 161.
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the public interest at its centre, was ultimately reflected in the judicial
regulatory measures traced in this article, beginning in the late 1970s.
The public scrutiny faced by Canadian lawyers in the 1970s finds its
most tangible reflection in a number ofpublic inquiries into the professions.
Two government commissions in the late 1960s were particularly
influential. First, in Quebec, the 1970 Quebec Report of the Commission
of Inquiry on Health and Social Welfare Part V (the "Castonguay-Nepveu
Report") 16 led to the adoption of a new ProfessionalCode17 in 1973 that
"effected a complete reorganization in the regulation of professions"18 and
placed the protection of the public as the prime regulatory objective. 9
Second, in Ontario, the first report of the province's Royal Commission
Inquiry into Civil Rights2" inspired, "for the first time in a half-century...
systematic scrutiny" of the legal profession in Ontario.21 The McRuer
Report's attitude toward self-government was generally skeptical2 2 but
ultimately did not call for the abolition of self-regulation. Instead, the
report modestly recommended that "[t]he power of self-government
should not be extended beyond the present limitations, unless it is clearly
established that the public interest demands it and that the public interest
could not be adequately safeguarded by other means."23 On the heels of
the McRuer Report, at least one commentator felt that the legal profession
was particularly "vulnerable to... attack" and that it fell to the courts to
remediate the narrow scope of civil liability faced by lawyers in relation
to their conduct in order to stave off closer governmental regulation of the
legal profession.24 As will be explored below, the courts did ultimately
take up this task in the late 1970s. The first response to the McRuer Report,
16. The name of the Report derives from the fact that the Commission had "initially been concerned
with the professions involved in the provision of health and social services[,]" but had expanded its
mandate as it "became convinced that since other professions faced problems that were similar in
nature, the matter should be approached globally." Pierre Issalys, "The Professions Tribunal and the
Control of Ethical Conduct among Professionals" (1978) 24 McGill LJ 588 at 592.
17. ProfessionalCode, CQLR c C-26.
18. Issalys, supra note 16 at 588.
19. Ibid at 588 and generally for the changes introduced. See also, "The Professional System,"
online: Conseil interprofessionnel du Quebec <http://www.professions-quebec.org/index.php/en!
elementl/visualiser /id/7>.
20. Ontario, Royal Commission, Inquiry into Civil Rights: Report No I (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
1968) [McRuer Report].
21. Harry Arthurs, "Authority, Accountability, and Democracy in the Government of the Ontario
Legal Profession" (1971) 49:1 CanBar Rev 1 at 1.
22. As framed in the McRuer Report, supra note 20 at 1162, "The relevant question is not, 'do
the practitioners of this occupation desire the power of self-government?,' but 'is self-government
necessary for the protection of the public?"'
23. Ibid, vol 3 at 1209.
24. TG Bastedo, "A Note on Lawyers' Malpractice: Legal Boundaries and Judicial Regulations"
(1969-1970) Osgoode Hall U 311 at 311.
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however, came in the form of legislative change. A new Law Society Act25
was passed in 1970, which introduced several measures explicitly focused
on increasing the public accountability of the Law Society and protecting
the public interest.26
Although the governmental commissions in both Ontario and Quebec
led to legislative reforms, the legal profession in each of the two provinces
maintained a considerable amount of autonomy.27 This is, perhaps,
unsurprising given that the reforms instituted in Quebec and Ontario
came after intensive periods of consultation with, and resistance by, the
legal profession28 and that the final legislative product in each province
represented a compromise. As the 1970s progressed, additional legislative
committees were set up to examine the professions in Manitoba and
Alberta,2 9 and further review took place in Ontario in 1977.30 Another
flurry of governmental reviews of the professions came in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.31 In 2007, the federal government stepped in to make its
mark as the Competition Bureau released a study into the self-regulated
25. RSO 1970, c 238.
26. These measures included, for example, provision for decisions by benchers in disciplinary
matters to be appealable to the Ontario Court of Appeal and the designation of the Attorney General
as an ex officio bencher, and to be "the guardian of the public interest in all matters within the scope
of the [Law Society Act] or having to do with the legal profession" For further discussion, see, e.g.,
Arthurs, "Authority, Accountability, and Democracy," supra note 21.
27. As reported by Harry Arthurs over a decade after the new legislation was introduced, "[t]he
new Quebec regime apparently functions without much direct intervention in the profession's affairs"
and "[t]here is, in fact, little concrete evidence ... to suggest that the autonomy of the Quebec bar
has been eroded": Arthurs, "Public Accountability of the Legal Profession," supra note 15 at 179180; Arthurs et al, "The Canadian Legal Profession" (1986) Am B Found Res J 447 at 476. Arthurs
similarly reported that, "in Ontario, neither the lay benchers nor the Attorney General, in his role as a
bencher ex officio, appear[ed] to have taken any policy initiatives": Arthurs, "Public Accountability of
the Legal Profession," supra note 15 at179-180.
28. For further discussion, see, e.g.,
Christopher Moore, The Law Society of Upper Canada and
Ontario Lawyers, 179 1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at283-284; and Arthurs,
"Public Accountability of the Legal Profession," supra note 15 at 179-180.
29. Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Special Committee of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta on
the Professions and Occupations, Report I (Edmonton: Queen's Printer, 1973); Alberta, Legislative
Assembly, Special Committee of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta on the Professions and
Occupations, Report II (Edmonton: Queen's Printer, 1973); FC Muldoon, Report of the Manitoba
ProfessionalAssociationsStudy Group (1972).
30. Ontario, Professional Organizations Committee, The Professional Organizations Report

(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1980). For further discussion, see Carolyn J Tuohy
"Public Accountability of Professional Groups: The Case of the Legal Profession in Ontario" in
Robert G Evans & Michael J Trebilcock, Lawyers and the Consumer Interest: Regulatingthe Market

for Legal Services (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982) 105 at 115.
31. Alberta, Council on Professions and Occupations, Discussion Paper: Principles and Policies
Governing Professional Legislation in Alberta by Diane Morash (Edmonton: Professions and

Occupations Bureau, 1989); Saskatchewan, Discussion Paper: Towards the Development of a
Professions Policy for Saskatchewan (Regina: Queen's Printer, 1990); Manitoba, Law Reform
Commission, RegulatingProfessions and Occupations(Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1994).

The Judicial Regulation of Lawyers in Canada

professions in which a number of specific recommendations were made
regarding the governance of the legal profession.32
Notwithstanding being subject to repeated reviews for several decades,
beginning in the 1970s, Canadian lawyers emerged largely unscathed and
provincial law societies retained significant powers of self-regulation.33
One important effect of this sustained scrutiny, however, was to raise the
profile and solidly entrench public interest as the dominant norm against
which lawyer regulation was to be measured.34 Although, as will be
discussed below, the legal profession itself took steps to check its selfinterest when faced with this scrutiny, its posture was considerably more
defensive and reactive when compared with judicial measures taken during
this same time period. Parts III and IV will trace how judges expanded the
scope and depth of their reach in lawyer regulation, ousted self-interested
standards adopted by the legal profession itself, and were an important part
of the background conditions that pushed the legal profession to undertake
its own reforms in some instances.
III. Regulation of the practice of law: a new era of negligence
This Part examines developments in the courts' regulation of the practice
of law and, in particular, looks at reforms to the civil liability of lawyers
in negligence. As a result of the courts' rejection of exceptional treatment
for lawyers in this area and their creation of new sources of liability for
lawyers rooted in negligence, the competence of lawyers is now subject to
more rigourous scrutiny and examined across a greater number of contexts
than in the pre-1970s era. In undertaking these measures, the courts have,
therefore, both asserted themselves in a key regulatory area (post-entry
competence) and, in doing so, have mitigated a key risk associated with
profession self-regulation (insufficiently zealous monitoring of post-entry
competence). The result has been a regulatory regime more attentive to the
public interest in this area of regulatory concern.

32.

Competition Bureau of Canada, Self-Regulated Professions Balancing Competition and

Regulation (Gatineau: Competition Bureau, 2007). The five professions examined were accountants,
lawyers, optometrists, pharmacists, and real-estate agents. Abrief post-study assessment was published
in 2011.

33.

For example, as reported by Harry Arthurs with respect to the results of second Ontario review:
The Committee's formal Report, obviously intended to mollify the Law Society, ...virtually
accepted the status quo in all matters pertaining to the Society's internal government and
policies.
Arthurs, "Public Accountability of the Legal Profession," supra note 15 at 172 [footnotes omitted].
34. See, e.g., the discussion in Wesley W Pue, "Foxes, Henhouses, Unfathomable Mysteries, and the
Sufferance of the People: A Review of Regulating Professions and Occupations" (1996) 24 Man LJ
283.
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1. Rejecting exceptions
a. Eliminatingimmunity
In the late 1970s, Canadian courts rejected "the most dramatic example"35
of exceptional treatment for lawyers in negligence law in confirming that
the English doctrine of advocates' immunity had no place in Canadian law.
Although, in 2000, the House of Lords ultimately abolished the operation
of this doctrine, it was considered well-settled law at the time in England
and Wales that barristers were immune from suit in relation to the conduct
and management of a case in court.36 Translated into practice, the effect of
this immunity was significant: it meant, for example, that barristers would
not be subject to an action "for calling or not calling a particular witness,
or for putting or not putting a particular question, or for honestly taking
a view of the case which may turn out to be quite erroneous."37 Despite
the harsh effects of this immunity for clients who wished to seek relief
for negligent conduct of their lawyers in court, it was not idiosyncratic to
England and Wales. New Zealand, for example, recognized this doctrine
until 2006.38 Further, amidst controversy, the immunity has been retained
to date in Australia.3 9
Traditionally, the English courts had justified the immunity on the
basis that it would be unfair to allow clients to sue barristers for negligence
when the barristers were unable to sue clients for their fees. Given that
Canadian lawyers could sue for their fees, early Canadian precedent held
that the English courts' rationale for the immunity (and therefore the
immunity itself) could not be imported to the Canadian context.4" This
precedent, however, came under question after the 1967 English decision
Rondel v. Worsley41 where the House of Lords shifted the justification
for the immunity away from the treatment of fees and, instead, rooted
the immunity in public policy grounds. The new public policy grounds
given-for example, claims that lawyers needed to be protected from the
threat of lawsuits in order to be able to zealously represent their clients or

35.

Gene Anne Smith, "Liability for the Negligent Conduct of Litigation: The Legacy of Rondel v

Worsley" (1982-1983)47 Sask L Rev 211 at 212.

36.

Although the immunity was first understood and applied in relation to barristers, the House of

Lords confirmed that this immunity extended to solicitors in SaifAli v Sydney Mitchell & Co, [1980]
AC 198 HL (Eng).
37. Thomas Beven, Neglience in Law vol 2, 3rd ed (London: Stevens and Haynes, 1908) 1204

[footnotes omitted].
38.
39.

Lai v Chamberlains,[2006] NZSC 70, [2007] 2 NZLR 7.
See, Goddard Elliott (a firm) v Fritsch, [2012] VSC 87 and Donnellan v Woodland, [2012]

NSWCA 433 as examples of recent cases where this immunity has been applied in Australia.
40. Leslie v Ball (1863), 22 UCR 512 [the court is Upper Canada Queen's Bench].
41.

Rondelv Worsley, [1967] UKHL 5, [1969] 1 AC 191 [Rondel].
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that negligence actions against barristers would inevitably require retrying
the original actions and potentially create inconsistent results-were not
obviously inapplicable in the Canadian context.42
Following the decision in Rondel, several Canadian cases considered
the effect of the House of Lords' new public policy rationale and left open
the possibility that some form of immunity from negligence existed for
Canadian lawyers.43 However, in 1979, Krever J of the Ontario High Court
of Justice clarified in Demarco v. Ungaro that the English immunity had
no place in Canadian law.44 In support of this conclusion, Krever J cited
the public interest, albeit in a negative fashion, stating that "the public
interest.., does not require that our Courts recognize an immunity. '45 To
be sure, Krever J's choice of language was influenced by the repeated
reference of the Law Lords in Rondel v. Worsley to "public interest" in
their defence of the immunity. It is also apparent, however, that Krever J
took seriously the perspective of the Canadian public, writing: "I do not

believe that enlightened, non-legally trained members of the community
would agree with me if I were to hold that the public interest requires that
litigation lawyers be immune from actions for negligence. ",46
It is now well settled across Canada that the doctrine of advocates'
immunity does not insulate lawyers from negligence actions. While the

42. With the possible exception of one of the rationales given that was rooted in the cab-rank rule.
Indeed, in a commentary published in the Canadian Bar Review shortly following the decision,
Marvin Catzman opined that, notwithstanding the fact that English precedents were not binding in
Commonwealth countries,
it will have not escaped the reader's attention that substantially all of the considerations of
public interest which the members of the House of Lords found so compelling are equally
appropriate to the realities of Canadian litigation In the writer's review, therefore, it is not
unlikely that, when a Canadian Rondel and a Canadian Worsley have the mutual misfortune
to combine, our courts may well extend the immunity from action which the House of Lords
saw fit to bestow upon Worsley to his hapless Canadian counterpart.
(Mavin A Catzman (1968) 46:3 Can Bar Rev 505 at 515.)
43. See, e.g., Banks v Reid (1974), 6 OR (2d) 404 (SC (TD), wherein the trial judge commented
that, although he had dismissed the allegations of negligence against the defendant lawyer on other
grounds, he would have dismissed the case on the basis of Rondel v Worsley in any event. The Court
of Appeal, (1977) 18 OR (2d) 148 (CA), reversed the trial judge's decision on other grounds; however,
Brooke JA, writing for the court, also commented:
If it is applicable at all in this jurisdiction, where practitioners are both barristers and
solicitors, Rondel v. Worsley should be confined to issues between a barrister and his client
in the discharge of the barrister's duties before a Court[.]
A similar comment was made by the court in Gouzenko v Harris(1976), 13 OR (2d) 730 (H Ct J),
wherein Justice Goodman wrote that "[e]ven if [Rondel v Worsley] is applicable to persons engaged
in providing the services of a barrister in this province, it is, in my opinion, of no assistance to the
solicitors in this case." See, also, BeckmatLeaseholds Ltdv Tassou (1978), 14 AR 468 (Dist Ct).
44. Demarco v Ungaro (1979), 21 OR (2d) 673 (H Ct J) [Demarco].
45. Ibid at 238 [emphasis added].
46. Ibid
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result in Demarco is likely intuitive to most Canadian lawyers today, it
was more controversial at the time. As the Assistant Secretary of The
Law Society of Upper Canada observed in a case comment following the
decision: "[fto many counsel Mr. Justice Krever's decision is tantamount
to the opening of Pandora's box."4 Skeptics could also be found in British
Columbia as late as 1985, when an article appeared in a legal trade journal
advocating that the immunity be retained in that province notwithstanding
the decision in Demarco.4"
The decision in Demarco was a forceful rejection of the proposition
that exceptional treatment of the legal profession in the area of negligence
was in the public interest. As noted by one academic at the time, however:
"Although the Demarco decision may have opened the door to actions by
a client against an advocate for negligent conduct of litigation.., once over
the threshold the plaintiff may find his passage through the corridors of the
halls ofjustice severely impeded."4 9 Eventually, however, the courts began
to chip away at these additional impediments to lawyer liability as well.
b. Securing concurrent liability
A second area of exceptionalism was addressed in the 1980s when the
courts clarified that lawyers could have concurrent liability in contract and
negligence. Notwithstanding the reference in Demarco to immunity (or
lack thereof) of lawyers from actions in negligence, there was considerable
controversy at the time as to whether lawyers owed any duty of care to
clients independent of implied duties of care that could be said to exist
under lawyer-client contracts. Historically, English "authorities commonly
held that it did not manner how an action against a solicitor was framed
-in contract or in tort."5 In the case of Groom v. Crocker,5 1 however,
the English Court of Appeal held that "[t]he relationship [between]
solicitor and client is a contractual one" and that "[i]t was by virtue of that
relationship that the duty [to the client] arose, and it had no existence apart
from that relationship.'

47.

Stephen E Traviss, "ABarrister's Liability to Civil Suit in Ontario: A Case Comment onDemarco

v. Ungaro andBarycky " (1979) 13 Law Society Gazette 262 at 269.
48. Bryan Baynham & Andrew Baldwin, "Barristers' Immunity" (1985) 43:5 The Advocate 611 at

614. Note, however, that a dissenting view was also published in the subsequent issue of the trade
journal: Darrell W Roberts, "Barrister's Immunity-A Different View" (1986) 44:2 The Advocate
197.
49. Smith, supra note 35 at 212.

50.

Stephen M Grant & Linda Rothstein, Lawyers' Professional Liability, 2nd ed (Toronto:

Buttersworth Canada, 1998) at 6.
51. Groom v Crocker, [1939] 1 KB 194.
52. Ibid at 205.
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Following Groom v. Crocker, there was "considerable authority" in
Canada in support of the proposition that liability to a client existed in
contract only, although the matter remained unsettled due to a number
of conflicting judgments. 3 At stake in this distinction was more than
semantics: "[i]mportant legal consequences have turned on the differences
in the rules applicable to contractual and tortious liability... [most
particularly, in the areas of] limitation of actions, measure of damages and
54
apportionment of liability.
The possibility of concurrent liability in contract and tort was ultimately
resolved by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1986 decision of Central
Trust Co. v. Rafuse.55 Writing for the court, LeDain J concluded that
concurrent liability in tort and in contract was available in cases of lawyer
negligence, noting that "[t]here is no sound reason of principle or policy
why the solicitor should be in a different position in respect of concurrent
liability from that of other professionals. '56 Once again, the concept of
exceptional treatment for legal professionals was firmly rejected.
c. Standardof care
Judicial scrutiny of lawyer liability in negligence did not end, however,
with the rejection of advocates' immunity and the acceptance of concurrent
liability. The standard of care applicable to lawyer conduct was the next
target. At a general level, the standard of care imposed on Canadian
lawyers has long been articulated in the same terms: a lawyer must bring
reasonable care, skill, and knowledge to the professional service that he or
she has undertaken. What this standard actually requires and the manner
in which it has been framed, however, has changed significantly over the
past few decades.
In several different ways, the courts historically articulated the standard
of care applicable to lawyers in a manner that suggested that lawyers were
subject to less rigourous scrutiny. For example, throughout most of the
twentieth century, Canadian courts regularly cited a standard of crassa

53.

Harry B Radomski, "Actions Against Solicitors-Contract or Tort?" (1979-1981) 2 Advocates'

Q 160 at 179. See also, Allen M Linden, Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977) at 108

[footnotes omitted]: "The duty owed by a lawyer to his client has been founded on contract, not on tort,
for well over a century."
54.
55.

CentralTrust Co vRafuse, [1986] 2 SCR 147 at para 13 [Rafuse].
Ibid.

56. Ibid at para 52.
57. See, e.g., Hett v Pong, [1890] 18 SCR 290 at 292: "an attorney is bound to bring to the exercise
of his profession a reasonable amount of knowledge, skill and care in connection with the business
of his client." This language has been cited approvingly in a number of subsequent cases, including
Rafuse, supra note 54 at 208 and Ristimaki v Cooper (2006), 79 OR (3d) 648 (CA) at para 59.
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negligentia or "gross negligence" in addressing lawyer negligence. 8 The
reference to crassanegligentiacreated some tension in light ofthe broader
recognized standard of requiring that lawyers use reasonable care, skill,
and knowledge. The broader standard suggested that mere negligence was
sufficient to ground liability, while crassanegligentiasuggested something
more was required in the form of gross negligence.
The 1979 Demarco decision, discussed above, served to introduce
further confusion. In the course of his reasons rejecting advocates'
immunity, Justice Krever also commented that he found "it difficult to
believe that a decision made by a lawyer in the conduct of a case will
be held to be negligence as opposed to a mere error of judgment. But
there may be cases in which the error is so egregious that a Court will
conclude that it is negligence."5 9 Picking up on this language, courts
in a number of different provinces began to apply an "egregious error"
standard to actions in negligence brought against lawyers.6" As with the
use of the crassa negligentia or gross negligence standard, the language
of egregious error "suggests that lawyers enjoy a more forgiving standard
of care than that which is expected of other professionals."61 As observed
by one commentator, in practice, the use of an "egregious error" standard
effectively meant that lawyers continued to enjoy a de facto immunity
from liability in negligence in connection with their conduct of a case in

58.

For example, in the 1915 case ofMarriottv Martin (1915), 21 BCR 161 (SC (1D)), the court

held that the plaintiff was required to establish not merely an error of judgment on the part of his
solicitor but a want of professional care and skill to such an extent as to render the defendant liable
for gross negligence. In arriving at this conclusion, the court reviewed the Canadian and English
authorities on the issue, including the statements of Lord Brougham in Purves v Landell that "[i]t is
of the very essence of [an action against a solicitor for negligence] that there should be a negligence
of a crass description, which we call crassa negligentia[.]" The reference to the standard of crassa
negligentiaby Canadian courts continued throughout the twentieth century. See, e.g., Schmalzbauer v
Gares(1990), 89 Sask R 254 (QB) at para 18;B & R FarmsLtdvJames Ulmer (1987), 55 Sask R 309
(QB) at para 10; Nielsen v Watson (1981), 33 OR (2d) 515 (H Ct J) at para 17; Pagev Dick (1980), 12
CCLT 43 (H Ct J); Samayoa v Marks (1974), 6 OR (2d) 419 (Sup Ct) at para 52; Brenner v Gregory,
[1973] 1 OR 252 (H Ct J) at para 13.
59. Demarco,supra note 44 at para 24.
60. Although not specifically mentioning a standard of "egregious error," the Ontario Court of
Appeal approvingly cited the test set out in Demarco in Wong v Thomson, Rogers, 1994 CarswellOnt
2925 (WL Can) (CA). A number of lower court decisions specifically applied the "egregious error"
standard. See, e.g., Karpenko v Paroian,Courey, Cohen & Houston (1980), 30 OR (2d) 776 (ON Sup
Ct), applying the standard to settlements; Forbesv Siskind, Cromarty,Ivey & Dowler LLP (2003),

20 CCLT (3d) 87 (Sup Ct), applying the standard with respect to counsel's conduct in an arbitration;
Bhagat v Raby (Trustee of), 2000 CarswellOnt 1094 (WL Can) (Sup Ct), in relation to advice given
to negotiate rather than appeal a court order; Simanek v Lamourie, 2001 CarswellOnt 3559 (WL Can)
(Sup Ct), regarding conduct in family law litigation; Noble v Lourensse, 2001 NBQB 251, regarding
conduct of litigation in a real property matter.
61. Meister v Coyle, 2010 NSSC 125 at para 40.
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court.62 Evidence that lawyers themselves believed that this was a lower
standard can be found in a case heard subsequent to the egregious error
test being rejected by the courts, wherein counsel for the defendant lawyer
submitted (unsuccessfully) that the egregious error test should nonetheless
be applied in order to avoid an improper retroactive application of the
law.63
In the early 2000s, courts ultimately clarified that lawyers are not
subject to any special treatment when it comes to the standard of care.
Two provincial appellate court decisions, in particular, stand out in firmly
rejecting the egregious error standard. In 2003, the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal reviewed the comments in Demarco and noted that "[t]o find
a different standard of care for lawyers performing barristers' work than
for those doing solicitors' work is really a means of introducing barristers'
immunity in a different form, and should probably be rejected for the same
reasons." 64 Shortly thereafter, the Ontario Court of Appeal also rejected
the concept of applying an exceptional standard of care to the conduct
of lawyers. 65 Writing for the Court, Doherty JA stated: "The decisions of
other professionals are routinely subjected to a reasonableness standard in
negligence lawsuits. I see no reason why lawyers should not be subjected
to the same standard. 66
2. Opening new frontiers of liability
a. Liability to non-clients
In addition to shutting down exceptional treatment for Canadian lawyers
in negligence law, the courts also expanded lawyers' liability in negligence
in several respects. Liability to non-clients is one important area in which
this occurred. Historically, liability in negligence of Canadian lawyers
to non-clients was "extremely limited.16' Beginning in the late 1970s,
however, the courts began to expand lawyers' obligations to third parties
in modest but significant ways. 68 The two major areas of liability to third
parties that emerged were: (1) where the third party was able to establish
that they reasonably relied on the lawyer to protect their interests, 69 and
(2) where the third party was an intended (but failed) beneficiary of a
62.
Law
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Beverly G Smith, ProfessionalConduct for Lawyers and Judges (Fredericton, NB : Maritime
Book, 1998) at 74.
DiMartinovDelisio (2008), 58 CCLT (3d) 218 (ON Sup Ct).
Henderson vHagblom, 2003 SKCA40 atpara 69, 232 SaskR 81 (CA).
Follandv Reardon (2005), 249 DLR (4th) 167 (ON CA) at para 41.
Ibid [footnote omitted].
Grant & Rothstein, supra note 50 at 65.
Ibid.
See discussion in Grant & Rothstein, supra note 50 at 70.
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0
will where the lawyer has been retained by the testator."
The first area
of expanded liability followed logically from the general expansion
of Canadian negligence law to permit recovery of pure economic loss
in cases of negligent misrepresentation, following the House of Lord's
1
decision in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners."
The second area of
liability-liability of a lawyer in negligence to an intended beneficiary of
a will-was more exceptional in that the courts found that lawyers could
be liable to a non-client in the absence of any contractual relationship or
other reliance. 2
In a 2000 decision, for example, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
drew from English authority in noting that one of the "reasons ofjustice"
for holding lawyers liable in cases of "disappointed beneficiaries" was
that "the public relies on lawyers to prepare effective wills... [and] [t]o
deny an effective remedy amounts to a refusal to acknowledge a lawyer's
professional role in the community." 3 Courts in other provinces have
now approvingly cited the rationales for the duty as provided by the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. 4 In expanding the liability of lawyers in
negligence to non-clients, albeit in limited circumstances, the courts have
again further extended their reach in the area of post-entry competence
and have done so in a manner that has favoured the public interest at the
expense of the interests of the profession.

b. Personalresponsibilityfor costs 5
Lawyers also now face expanded liability in terms of their potential
personal responsibility for costs of litigation. Although Canadian courts
have long had the power to order a lawyer to personally pay the costs
of litigation in cases where the lawyer has improperly conducted himself
or herself, the threshold for making such orders has been lowered over
the past several decades. Historically, Canadian courts relied on English
authority to hold that the lawyers' conduct must amount to something

70. See discussion in ibid at 70-97; and Debra Rolph, "Solicitors' Liability to Non-Clients in
Negligence" (1993) 15 Advocates' Q 129.
71.
72.
73.
74.

[1964] AC 465.
Grant & Rothstein, supra note 50 at 83; Rolph, supra note 70 at 153-154.
Earlv Wilhelm, 2000 SKCA 1 at para 35, 183 DLR (4th) 45.
See, e.g., McCullough v Riffert, 2010 ONSC 3891 at para 48, 76 CCLT (3d) 71.

75. The material found in this section is both directly taken and developed from material previously
published in Amy Salyzyn, "A Comparative Study of Attorney Responsibility for Fees of an Opposing
Party" (2013) 3:2 St. John's J Int'l Comp L 71.
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akin to gross negligence before liability for costs would be imposed.76
Following the 1993 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Young v.Young,
the standard used morphed somewhat into focussing on the issue of "bad
faith" and took on a decidedly subjective hue.78 These decisions, however,
were rooted in the court's inherent jurisdiction to make such orders. As
the years progressed, courts moved to apply objective negligence-based
standards under provincial statutory provisions providing for costs against
lawyers personally rather than the court's inherent jurisdiction. Although
costs orders against lawyers personally remain the exception rather than
the rule, lawyers now face an increased scope of liability under objective
negligence-based standards.
In Ontario, for example, Rule 57.07 was introduced in 1985 and
empowered courts to order a lawyer to personally pay the costs of any
party where the lawyer "has caused costs to be incurred without reasonable
cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default.17 9 At
the time of its introduction, Rule 57.07 was "entirely new"8 and members

76. Paul Perell, "Ordering a Solicitor Personally to Pay Costs" (2001) 25 Advocates' Q 103 at 103104. See, e.g., the Ontario Court of Appeal's comments in Re Ontario Crime Commission, [1963]
1 OR 391 at para 23 (CA), whereby the court ordered a lawyer to personally pay costs where he
had knowingly filed a false affidavit of a client. In so ordering, the court quoted from Lord Wright's
speech inMyers v Elman including his statement that, "[a] mere mistake or error ofjudgment is not
generally sufficient [for the court's exercise of its inherent disciplinary authority], but a gross neglect
or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor's duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice."
77. Young v Young, [1993] 4 SCR 3.
78. The Supreme Court found that no cost should be awarded against the lawyer personally in
Young. Following Young, a number of Canadian courts cited Justice McLachlin's comments therein as
having established the proposition that the exercise of the courts' inherent jurisdiction to award costs
against lawyers personally required a finding of "bad faith." See, e.g., Schwisberg v Perry Krieger &
Associates (1997), 33 OR (3d) 256 (CA); MarchandvPublic GeneralHospital Society of Chatham et

al (1998), 16 CPC (4th) 201 (ON Gen Div); Markdale Ltd v Ducharme (1998), 238 AR 98 (QB).
79. Rules of CivilProcedure,RRO 1990, Reg 194, s 57.07.
80. W David Scott, "Costs and the Rules of Civil Procedure" in New Rules of Civil Procedure
(Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, The Canadian Bar Association-Ontario, The Advocates'
Society, 1984) at 12-2.
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of the profession expressed concern about its potential effects. 1 Within
weeks of Rule 57.07 coming into force, one Ontario lawyer brought an
application for a declaration that the rule was of no force and effect on
several grounds, including alleging that the rule unduly infringed the
independence of the bar and violated certain constitutional rights.82 The
application ultimately made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada,
which held that the lawyer was not entitled to proceed with the application
.as presently constituted" given his failure to present an adequate factual
foundation.83 The hostility to Rule 57.07 among the legal profession is
reflected in the Supreme Court's decision: Sopinka J noted in the opening
paragraph of his reasons that Rule 57.07 was "known colloquially among
the Ontario Bar as the 'Torquemada Rule' referencing "the first grand
inquisitor of the Spanish Inquisition whose name has become synonymous
with cruelty."84
The courts were initially divided as to whether more than "mere
negligence" was required to make an order under 57.07. This issue was
ultimately resolved by Granger J in Marchand (Litigation Guardian of)
85 who concluded that
v.Public General Hospital Society of Chatham
the "ordinary meaning of the words contained therein can be applied
to determine if an order for costs should be made against the solicitor
personally."86 Justice Granger held that lawyers could be responsible for
costs in cases of "mere negligence" as well as in circumstances that "fall
short of negligence" such as cases where "bad judgment" not amounting
to negligence causes undue delay in a trial. 7
81. The comments of David W Scott, a senior practitioner in Ontario, reflect a number of the
profession concerns at the time:
The fact that a significant portion of the relief encompassed by Rule 57.07 was available

in the ordinary exercise of the Court's extraordinary discretion is beside the point. The
codification of this relief is, I would suggest, ominous. It is not a rle which will give much
pause to the experienced practitioner. The inexperienced members of the Bar are another
matter. How many times have we all, in our developing years, agonized over claims to
make, issues to raise, lines of questioning to develop, as part of our responsibilities to our
clients in the framework of our roles as officers of the Court? Will this process, in the hands
of the young lawyer, be encouraged to the advantage of the client if the sword of Rule

57.07 hangs over counsel's head as a backdrop against which the strategy of presenting the
client's case is developed? It is not unlikely that codification and expansion of this drastic
remedy may serve to intimidate the responsible lawyer more than the reverse.
Ibid at 12-8-12-9.
82. Re Danson and Attorney-Generalof Ontario (1985), 51 OR (2d) 405 (H Ct J).
83. Danson v Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 SCR 1086 at para 28.

84.

Ibid at para 2.

85.
CPC
86.
87.

Marchand (Litigation Guardian of)v Public General Hospital Society of Chatham (1998), 16
(4th) 201 (ON Gen Div) [Marchand].
Ibidatpara 115.
Ibidatpara 121.
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Although in Marchandthe confirmation of a lower, negligence-based
standard for awarding costs against lawyers personally did not translate
into a cost award against the lawyer, a number of subsequent cases have
relied on an ordinary standard of negligence in awarding such costs.88
Courts in other provincial jurisdictions have also adopted an approach
consistent with that taken by Ontario courts. The British Columbia Court
of Appeal, for example, recently confirmed that "mere delay and mere
neglect may, in some circumstances, be sufficient for [an order of costs]
against a lawyer" personally. 9 Although orders of costs against lawyers
personally remain rare in Canada, this is yet another area wherein lawyers
face expanded liability before the courts following the triumph of an
objective negligence-based test over a subjective test rooted in bad faith.
3. Judges andpost-entry competence
As a result of the developments canvassed above, Canadian lawyers today
face a materially increased scope of liability in negligence compared to
what they encountered in the early 1970s. Courts have firmly rejected
exceptional treatment for lawyers in negligence by clarifying: (1) that
advocates' immunity does not apply in Canada, (2) that lawyers are
concurrently liable in contract and tort, and (3) that no special standard
of "gross negligence" or "egregious error" applies to the legal profession.
Courts have also opened up new frontiers of liability in the areas of duties
owed to third parties and costs orders against lawyers personally. One clear
consequence of these developments is that there is now more rigourous
monitoring of the post-entry competence of lawyers and increased
exposure to civil penalties for incompetence.
There are possible objections that should be considered, however,
to the characterization of these developments as aggressive judicial
regulation of the legal profession. First, it might be observed that the legal
profession itself was first to wade into the area of post-entry competence
in the 1970s and, therefore, suggested that the judicial measures taken

88. See, e.g., Beardy v Canada(Attorney General) (2003), 42 CPC (5th) 181 (ON Sup Ct); Burrell v
Peel (RegionalMunicipality)Police Services Board, 2007 CarswellOnt 7767 (WL Can) (ON Master);
McDonaldv StandardLifeAssurance Co (2007), 50 CCLI (4th) 301 (ON Sup Ct); Kerr v CIBC World
Markets Inc, 2013 ONSC 1109. In GalganovvRussell (Township) 2012 ONCA410, 294 OAC 13, the
Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that the appropriate standard to be applied under Rule 57.07 is as

set out in Marchandand that "mere negligence can attract costs consequences in addition to actions or
omissions which fall short of negligence."
89. Nazmdeh v Spraggs, 2010 BCCA 131 at 102, 83 CPC (6th) 201. Although, see also, Waters
v DaimlerChryslerFinancialServices Canada Inc, 2011 SKCA 53, 371 Sask R 153, wherein the

Saskatchewan Court of Appeal considered the issue of lawyer responsibility for costs in terms of the
inherent jurisdiction of the court and relied on, inter alia, Young v Young in setting out a threshold of

serious dereliction of duty.
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were responsive to the profession's own regulatory efforts rather than
examples of aggressive judicial regulation in contradistinction to the
profession's defensive self-regulation.9" Although, today, one might be
inclined to think of a self-imposed rule relating to competence as a longstanding component of a code of professional conduct for lawyers, this
is not the case. In fact, "competence was essentially not on [lawyers']
agenda at all until the 1970s."91 A requirement of competence was first
introduced in 1974, when the Canadian Bar Association adopted a new
Code of ProfessionalConduct to replace the vague and largely hortatory
Canons of Legal Ethics adopted in 1920.92 Prior to the 1974 CBA Code
"incompetence was not explicitly stigmatized as unacceptable behavior....
[and] [a]s a consequence, almost no one in Canada ha[d] ever been
disbarred for incompetence except lawyers who have suffered a virtually
total collapse of personality and have become unable to carry on their
practice. ,9

Despite the profession's claim to first efforts in the area of postentry competence, there is a strong argument to be made that the judicial
measures described above were, in fact, contradictory rather than
complementary to the legal profession's efforts and, moreover, thatjudicial
efforts bore a closer connection to the public interest. As Harry Arthurs has
pointed out, the interest of law societies in the issue of competence can
be understood in relation to the introduction of mandatory malpractice
insurance schemes in the early 1970s. One major effect of such schemes
was that the law societies "for the first time acquired a direct stake in
the costs and consequences of incompetence" and, as a consequence, had
"strong motivation[s] to contain rising costs.., by attempting to reduce the

90.

Arthurs, "Public Accountability of the Legal Profession," supra note 15 at 178-179.

91.

Harry Arthurs, "The Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?"

(1995) 33:4 Alta L Rev 800 at 807.

92.

Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association,

1974) and Canadian Bar Association, Canons of Legal Ethics (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association,

1920). The introduced rule on "Competence and Quality of Service" read:
(a) The lawyer owes a duty to his client to be competent to perform any legal services
which the lawyer undertakes on his behalf.
(b) The lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner
and he should provide a quality of service at least equal to that which lawyers

generally would expect of a competent lawyer in a like situation.
Prior to the introduction of the 1974 CBA Code provisions, steps had been taken in
Quebec and British Columbia to increase focus on the competence of members of the legal
profession The 1974 CBA Code has, however, been singled out as
provid[ing] the major impetus for the movement of the Canadian law societies into
the regulation of professional competence and quality of service.
Hurlburt, infra note 108 at 118.
93. Arthurs et al, "The Canadian Legal Profession," supranote 27 at 490.
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incidence of claims. '94 In contrast, judicial efforts to reject exceptional
treatment and expand lawyers' liability in relation to civil negligence
claims clearly risk having the opposite effect of increasing the incidence
of claims.
In short, while the profession's actions can be read-at least in
part-as being undertaken with the self-interested motivation of keeping
insurance costs down, the actions of courts in the area of post-entry
competence are arguably more directly connected to the public's interest
in receiving competent legal services. It should also be pointed out that,
although lawyer competence has now been within the regulatory ambit
of law societies for several decades, law societies still rarely discipline
lawyers for incompetence. 95 Given this reality, judicial expansion of
malpractice liability may be appropriately viewed as a more aggressive
move to counteract the self-regulatory risk that post-entry competence
will be insufficiently monitored by the profession's own efforts.
Second, it might be pointed out that-notwithstanding the judiciary's
activity in the area of negligence-the courts have shown significant
deference in relation to competence when it comes to law societies'
control in the area of discipline. Take, for example, the Supreme Court
of Canada's decision in Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society Judicial
Committee where lacobucci J stated plainly that "[b]enchers are in the
97
best position to determine issues of misconduct and incompetence.
In Pearlman, lacobucci J also affirmed the self-governing status of the
legal profession and characterized "peer review" as an essential feature
of effective self-governance. 98 Similar sentiments were expressed by the
Supreme Court of Canada years later in Law Society of New Brunswick v.
Ryan,99where the court confirmed that a high degree of deference should be
accorded to the province's discipline committee and commented that "[t]
he Law Society is clearly intended to be the primary body that articulates
and enforces professional standards among its members.""1 ' Relying on

94. Arthurs, "Dead Parrot," supra note 91 at 807. It should be noted, as was pointed out by an
anonymous reviewer of this article, that incentives may differ between different jurisdictions as in
some jurisdictions (like, for example, Alberta), the insurer and law society are not separate bodies,
while in others they are (like, for example, Ontario).
95. For further discussion, e.g., Alice Woolley, "Regulation in Practice: The 'Ethical Economy' of
Lawyer Regulation and a Case Study in Lawyer Deviance" (2012) 15:2 Legal Ethics 243.
96. Pearlmanv ManitobaLaw Society JudicialCommittee, [1991] 2 SCR 869 [Pearlman].
97. Ibid at 880.
98. Ibid at 890.
99. Law Society ofNew BrunswickvRyan, 2003 SCC 20, [2003] 1 SCR 247 [Ryan].
100. Ibid at para 40.
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these authorities and others, Canadian courts are reluctant to interfere with
decisions of law society discipline committees.
The object of the argument here, however, is not to contend that courts
have come to exclusively govern the area of post-entry competence, but
rather that they have expanded their reach in this area in recent decades
and have done so with the public interest in mind. Moreover, it should
be noted that-notwithstanding the strong comments in Pearlman and
Ryan-there are a number of significant ways in which courts have come
to intrude into the law society's disciplinary sphere of authority. First,
and most obviously, despite endorsing a deferential standard of review,
courts do judicially review the discipline decisions of law societies and, on
occasion, overturn them. Second, the courts have also shown a willingness
to review the actions of law societies at an institutional level and impose
civil liability where such disciplinary measures do not adequately attend
to the public interest. In 2004, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada
"sent a chill through the corridors of the provincial law societies""
1 1
after
1
2
releasing its decision in Finney v. Barreau du Qu~bec, 1 in which it held
that the Barreau du Qudbec was liable to pay damages to a member of
the public who had made a complaint regarding a Quebec lawyer. After
confirming that self-governing powers held by the Quebec legal profession
were not accorded for "private purposes" but rather delegated for the
public's interest, the Court held that "[t]he virtually complete absence ofthe
diligence called for in the situation amounted to a fault consisting of gross
carelessness and serious negligence."13 Although the Court's imposition
of a standard of "gross carelessness" was far from a radical interference in
the Barreau's authority to govern, 1 4 the judiciary's attention to the public
interest in the situation can be contrasted to "the highly adversarial and
protectionist stance of the Federation of Law Societies which, it seems,
was intervening on behalf of the law societies' interest rather than the
public interest." 10 5
101. Beppi Crosariol, "Supreme Court decision puts watchdogs on high alert," The Globe and Mail
(16 August 2004), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/food-and-wine/
supreme-court-decision-puts-watchdogs-on-high-alert/article365744/pagel>.
102. Finney v Barreaudu Quebec, 2004 SCC 36, [2004] 2 SCR 17.
103. Ibid at para 45.
104. As Devlin & Heffernan point out:
Even in finding for Finney, the Court did not set an impossibly high standard for the
Barreau to meet in its duty to the public. A standard of gross carelessness does not require
that the Barreau watch over the shoulder of every lawyer, all the time, but rather that it
institute effective, quick processes to deal with complaints as they come in, and to deal
with lawyers who are unfit to practice and are therefore a threat to the public[.]"
Supra note 7 at 174-175.
105. Ibid at 175.
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Third, the courts have rejected claims by the legal profession for
exclusive authority over the disciplining of lawyers and affirmed the
authority of other external regulators to also engage in disciplinary activity.
In Wilder v. Ontario (SecuritiesCommission)," 6 for example, the Ontario
Court of Appeal confirmed that the Ontario Securities Commission had
the authority to reprimand lawyers who appear before it and rejected the
submissions of the Law Society of Upper Canada that "it had exclusive
and exhaustive powers over the regulation of professional conduct of
lawyers."107
In conclusion, the primary mechanism through which judges regulate
the post-entry competence of lawyers is by administering civil actions in
negligence. In this area, courts have firmly rejected lawyer exceptionality
and expanded the scope of liability through a series of decisions beginning
in the late 1970s. Although law societies retain primary authority over
discipline proceedings-which also operate to regulate post-entry
competence-judges have taken modest measures that have intruded on
this authority as well. Such modest measures include imposing liability on
law societies in limited circumstances for failing to adequately meet their
mandate of regulating in the public interest and recognizing the authority
of other institutions to concurrently discipline lawyers. Together, these
developments reflect a trend of aggressive judicial regulation with the
result that there is now more rigourous, public interest-oriented and broadreaching scrutiny of lawyer competence than in the pre- 1970s era.
IV. Regulating the business of law: entry, competition, conduct
In addition to making their mark regulating the practice of law and, in
particular, post-entry competence, the courts have also taken a number of
significant measures in the last several decades with respect to regulating
the business of law. This Part examines judicial measures in three areas:
entry restrictions, post-entry limits on competition, and post-entry conduct
rules.
1. Entry restrictions
As noted in Part II, one potential abuse of self-governing powers is the
imposition of unnecessary entry restrictions. Rules restricting entry
to a profession are, of course, not inherently problematic. Requiring a
certain level or type of education before being allowed to practice law,
106. Wilder v Ontario (Securities Commission) (2001), 53 OR (3d) 519 (CA).
107. The quoted arguments were rejected by Justice Swinton at first instance at the Ontario Divisional
Court (Wilder v Ontario (Securities Commission) (2000), 47 OR (3d) 361) and Justice Swinton's

reasons on this issue were, in turn, adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal at paragraph 29 of its
decision, Wilder v Ontario (SecuritiesCommission) (2001), 53 OR (3d) 519 (CA).
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for example, is one way to ensure that those providing legal services
to the public have the appropriate training to do so. Entry restrictions
can, however, also operate to more nefarious discriminatory and anticompetitive ends. Indeed, the two types of entry restrictions that are the
subject of this section-citizenship requirements and constraints on interprovincial firms-were found by courts to be, respectively, discriminatory
and motivated by concerns to limit competition. Over the legal profession's
objections, courts declared the restrictions constitutionally invalid and
stepped into a core regulatory area with considerable force and impact.
In general, provincial and territorial law societies regulate admission
to the practice of law by prescribing entrance requirements and evaluating
whether applicants have met these requirements. The courts have no
direct authority over this regulatory area, although they are empowered
to judicially review the validity of decisions made by the law societies
in individual cases. 0 8 With the introduction of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in 1982, however, the courts were given a new tool to directly
review the validity of admission requirements. Two significant decisions
by the Supreme Court of Canada shortly after the introduction of the
Charter-Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia 9 and Black v.
Law Society of Alberta... resulted in the invalidation of certain entry
restrictions. These decisions, together with various legislative and policy
reforms that followed, ushered in a significantly liberalized regime with
respect to the admission of foreign professionals to practice and the
interprovincial mobility of lawyers.
a. Citizenshipand residency requirements
In Andrews, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the requirement
that applicants to British Columbia's legal profession be Canadian citizens.
At the time, "Canadian citizenship was virtually a universal requirement
for admittance to any of the provincial law societies"1 and law societies
were strong advocates of the limiting entry to the profession to Canadian

108. For a brief summary, see William H Hurlburt, The Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession in
Canadaand in England and Wales (Calgary: Law Society of Alberta, 2000) at 33-34.
109. Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 [Andrews].
110. Black v Law Society ofAlberta, [1989] 1 SCR 591 [Black].

111. Maurice Laprairie, "Regulatory Framework" in Adam M Dodek & Jeffrey G Hoskins eds,
Canadian Legal Practice: A Guide for the 21st Century, loose-leaf (consulted on 20 May 2012)

(Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada, 2009), ch i at 1-12. See, also, Ellen Murray, Citizenshipand
ProfessionalPracticein Ontario:A Working Paper (Toronto: Professional Organizations Committee,
1978) at 20-21 for a summary of the situation across Canada in 1978.
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citizens.112 On several occasions previous to Andrews, the courts had
considered citizenship requirements for admission to law practice and,
despite raising questions as to the justifiability of such requirements, had
declined to find them invalid." 3 These cases were heard before the equality
provisions of the Charterwere in force, however, they ultimately formed
the basis for the Supreme Court's finding in Andrews that the British
11 4
Columbia citizenship requirement was invalid.
In Andrews, the Law Society of British Columbia-which was a
party to the action-had vigorously defended the citizenship requirement,
arguing, inter alia,that the "vital role" role lawyers play in governmental
processes and in the administration of justice justified the rule. 15 In the
background, however, lurked less lofty motivations. When viewed in the
context of the long history of other nationality requirements imposed in
Canada in relation to voting, land-holding, and employment, it is difficult
to deny that xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments played a role in
the origination of citizenship requirements for legal professionals. 6 The
citizenship requirements may also be viewed as a protectionist measure
from a competition standpoint. Speaking about the citizenship requirement
in Manitoba in 1977, Jack London observed that it could "be seen as an
attempt to limit the numbers of persons entering the legal profession and
hence to provide a kind of import restriction in the numbers practicing law
in the community. The monopoly is maintained in many ways, this being
one."117 In rejecting the citizenship requirement in Andrews, the Supreme
Court of Canada overruled the Canadian legal profession's self-serving
view of who should be allowed to be a lawyer.
Post-Andrews, a number of provinces maintained a requirement that
an applicant for admission to practice be either a Canadian citizen or a
permanent resident. 1 8 Such requirements, however, came under attack
112. As Hurlburt reports: "As late as 1970, a committee of the Conference of Governing Bodies of the
Legal Profession in Canada recommended that citizenship be a requirement for a lawyer who wished
to transfer to another province and that a lawyer coming into Canada be required to acquire citizenship
before admission, though not before commencing to meet other requirements." Hulburt, supra note
108 at 87-88.
113. See Dickenson v Law Society ofAlberta (1978), 10 AR 120 (QB); and Law Society of Upper
Canadav Skapinker, [1984] 1 SCR 357.
114. Due to the operation of section 32(2) of the Charter,the provisions of section 15 came into force

three years later than the other provisions.
115. Andrews, supra note 109.

116. See discussion in Robert L Lenoir, "Citizenship as a Requirement for the Practice of Law in
Ontario" (1981) 13 Ottawa L Rev 527.
117. Jack R London, "The Admissions and Education Committee: A Perspective on Legal Education

and Admission to Practice in the Province of Manitoba-Past, Present and Future" in Cameron
Harvey, ed, The Law Society ofManitoba: 187

1977 (Winnipeg: Peguis, 1977) 74 at 98-99.

118. For a summary, see discussion in Hurlburt, supra note 108 at 88.
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with the release of the federal Competition Bureau's 2007 report on the
self-regulating professions.119 The report recommended that the residency
and citizenship requirements imposed in certain provinces be eliminated,
observing that, "[f]rom a competition standpoint, such restrictions limit
the supply of lawyers by imposing an additional requirement that lawyers
must meet before becoming members of a law society that has such a
restriction.1 12 With this additional push from the Competition Bureau,
a number of law societies have more recently removed residency and
citizenship requirements previously in place.121
b. Inter-provincialpractice of law
Shortly after Andrews, the Supreme Court of Canada waded into another
aspect of the legal profession's control over entry. In Black v Law Society
of Alberta,12 2 the Court declared invalid two rules enacted by the Law
Society of Alberta that aimed to restrict the emergence of inter-provincial
law firms in the province. 123 At the time, inter-provincial firms were
virtually unknown in Canada 124 and the provinces had differing opinions
regarding their desirability. 125 The specific rules enacted in Alberta were a
direct response to efforts by the Toronto law firm McCarthy and McCarthy
to establish an inter-provincial law firm with a branch in Alberta. Before
the Supreme Court of Canada, the Law Society of Alberta attempted to
justify the rules by arguing that they were necessary to protect
the quality
of legal services in the province. 126 As the trial judge concluded, however,
the worry that inter-provincial firms would increase competition and take
work away from Alberta lawyers formed at least part of the motivation

119. Competition Bureau of Canada, supra note 32.
120. Ibid at 67-68.

121. For example, Ontario's requirement was removed in 2007 such that an individual no longer
needs to be a permanent resident or a Canadian Citizen when entering the licensing process or for the
purpose of being called to the Bar of Ontario (see The Law Society of Upper Canada's Discussion,
online: <http://www.lsuc.oaca/FAQs> and Saskatchewan's requirement was removed in 2010 (see
discussion in (2010) 23:4 Benchers' Digest 1 at 2)).
122. Black, supra note 110.

123. The rules in question required, respectively, that (1) "An active member who ordinarily resides
in and carries on the practice of law within Alberta shall not enter into or continue any partnership,
association or other arrangement for the joint practice of law in Alberta with anyone who is not an
active member ordinarily resident in Alberta"; and (2): "No member shall be a partner in or associated
for the practice of law with more than one law firm." See Black, ibid at paras 7, 8.
124. Black v Law Society ofAlberta (1984), 57 AR 1 (QB) at para 38 [Black, QB].
125. Ibid at para 147.
126. Blackv Law Society ofAlberta [1989] 1 SCR 591 at paras 93 to 105.
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for the rules.12 Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada,
La Forest J found that the rules violated mobility rights guaranteed by
the Charterand rejected the Law Society's contention "that legal services
delivered to the public of Alberta would be endangered by interprovincial
law firms."128
Beginning in the late 1990s, the legal profession also began to
address the issue of inter-provincial mobility through a series of mobility
agreements entered into between provincial and territorial law societies. 2 9
Included among these measures is the National Mobility Agreement,
described on the Federation of Canadian Law Societies, website as
"the blueprint for the mobility regime... [that] facilitates temporary and
permanent mobility of lawyers between all common law provinces in
Canada." 3 ' The NationalMobility Agreement has eased the requirements
for permanently transferring between jurisdictions and also addresses
temporary mobility by allowing for lawyers to practice in other signatory
jurisdictions for up to 100 days a year without having to obtain a permit
(subject to certain restrictions). 3 '
The measures adopted by the legal profession to facilitate the
movement of legal professionals across provinces and those taken to ease
citizenship and residency requirements demonstrate the willingness of
Canadian lawyers to evolve under criticism. It bears highlighting, however,
that these measures only emerged after an initial period of resistance
and judicial decisions made over the forceful objections of provincial
law societies. Viewing these reforms in their historical context helps to
highlight the role that the judiciary has played in both changing the rules
of the game-for example, in eliminating bars on non-citizens in Andrews
and inter-provincial law firms in Black-and in setting the stage to prompt
the legal profession to pursue their own reforms.
2. Post-entry limits on competition
Examples of aggressive judicial regulation can also be found in the area of
post-entry limits on competition. This section examines judicial measures
127. On this point, the trial judge declined to find any bad faith on the part of the Alberta Law
Society, but noted at paragraph 35: "The debates of the benchers disclose that the issue of economic
protectionism was clearly raised. There was additionally in argument, expressed and implied, that
view that the benchers feared that the McCarthy firm in Toronto would take legal work away from
residents of this province." Black, QB, supra note 124.
128. Black, supra note 110 at para 93.
129. See discussion in Devlin & Cheng, supra note 1 at 248.
130. See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, "National Mobility of the Legal Profession,"
online: Federation of Law Societies of Canada <http://www.flsc.ca/en/national-mobility-of-the-legalprofession>.
131. Ibid.
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taken with respect to advertising, unauthorized practice, and fees. Once
again, measures by the courts may be seen as resulting in a regulatory
regime more attentive to the public interest. In this area, further judicial
rejection of self-serving rules and positions adopted by law societies can
be observed. In several important respects, decisions by the courts have
also prompted and enabled further reforms.
a. Advertising
Historically, the Canadian legal profession faced significant, self-imposed
restrictions in the area of advertising: close to a total ban was in place.132
Officially, this was justified as a matter of maintaining an appropriate level
of professionalism; the advertising of services was said to "lower the tone
' Such restrictions, however, also
of the lawyer's high calling."133
served
to advance the economic interests of lawyers through restricting price
competition. 34 For example, a study commissioned by the Competition
Bureau concluded that advertising restrictions imposed upon lawyers cost
Canadian consumers over $30,000,000 in 1970 alone. 35
Although the legal profession had started to take small steps to
liberalize rules governing advertising in the late 1970s following
legislative amendments that brought legal services under the ambit of

132. As reported in Mark Orkin's seminal text on legal ethics in 1957:
Solicitation of business by a lawyer is considered to be professional misconduct. In
particular, solicitation of business through the medium of advertising, whether direct or
indirect, is forbidden.
While the rule as so stated may be considered absolute, in practice it appears to admit
of some slight encroachments. An example is the use of name plates and business cards,
where the primary purpose of identification does not exclude some element of advertising,
in the sense of bringing the lawyer's name to the attention of the public.
Mark Orkin, Legal Ethics: A Study of Professional Conduct (Toronto: Cartwright, 1957) at 180

[footnotes omitted].
133. Ibid at 185. See also, the 1920 Canons of Legal Ethics (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association,
1920), Cannon 5(3) which stated:
The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards is not per se improper,
but solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements or by personal communications
or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to seek retainers through agents of any kind. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comment concerning causes in which the
lawyer has been or is connected, or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude
of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and the like selflaudations defy the traditions and lower the tone of the lawyer's high calling and should
notbe tolerated. The best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for personal capacity and fidelity to trust.
134. Competition Bureau of Canada, supra note 32 at 28-29.
135. Timothy R Muzondo & Bohumir Pazderka, Professional Licensing and Competition Policy:
Effects of Licensing on Earningsand Rates-of-return Differentials (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and

Services, 1979) at 127.
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federal competition law,136 significant changes only began to take place
in the mid-1980s after a series of court challenges. As was the case
with citizenship requirements, the courts had demonstrated some initial
137
hesitancy to intervene in this area before the introduction of the Charter.
Moreover, even after the Charter, it was not initially clear if and how the
new Charter right to freedom of expression would apply to commercial
speech and, in several early cases, lower courts were reluctant to find that
law society restrictions on lawyer advertising were unconstitutional.138
Increased judicial attention in addition to continuing interest shown by
government regulators, however, encouraged further liberalization on the
part ofthe law societies in the 1980s.139 In 1990, in Rocket v. Royal College
of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, the Supreme Court of Canada ultimately
affirmed that the Charter's freedom of expression protections applied
to professional advertising.14 This ruling made it clear that the legal
profession's rules on advertising would not be able to escape constitutional
scrutiny.
More than a decade later, with the release of its 2007 report on the
self-regulated professions, the Competition Bureau renewed pressure on
the legal profession to further relax rules with respect to advertising. In
reviewing the issue of lawyer advertising, the Bureau explicitly rejected
the submission of the Federation of Law Societies of Canada that the
regulations in place were necessary "to 'protect the public interest and
confidence in the legal system"' and took the position that "the restrictions
currently in place on advertising go outside of what is necessary to guarantee
this, since the public needs only to be protected against advertising that is

136. For example, as reported in The Report of the ProfessionalOrganizationsCommittee (Toronto:

Ministry of the Attorney General, 1980) at 194-195, in the late 1970s, the Law Society of Upper
Canada introduced a program that permitted lawyers to advertise up to three preferred areas of practice
in the Yellow Pages and other print media subject to certain pre-conditions. The Report also noted
"recent rule changes in Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia now allow most forms of price
advertising by lawyers."
137. Canada (Attorney General)v Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 SCR 307.
138. See, e.g., Re Law Society ofManitoba and Savino (1983), 1 DLR (4th) 285 (CA); Klein v Law
Society of Upper Canada (1985), 50 OR (2d) 118 (Div Ct).

139. As noted by Moore, supra note 28 at 316: "The Law Society of Upper Canada followed the
trend, voting to withdraw most of its professional conduct restrictions on advertising and other forms
of business-like competition. In September 1986, it abolished all limits on lawyers' advertising
except those of good taste, honesty, and verifiability." In other words, "the regulatory scheme, which
was formerly a general prohibition subject to expanding exceptions, was converted into a general
authorization subject to qualifiers." See Darryl Robinson, "Ethical Evolution: The Development of

the Professional Conduct Handbook of the Law Society of Upper Canada" (1995) 29:2 Law Society
Gazette 162 at 178-179.
140. Rocket v Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 SCR 232.
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' Following the release of the Bureau's report, law
false or misleading."141
societies continued their reforms of advertising rules.142

b. Unauthorizedpractice
Having individuals go through a licensing process before practicing law
and monitoring their activities thereafter is a means of protecting the
public from incompetent and unscrupulous practitioners. As with other
areas of professional control, however, the legal profession's interest in
preventing unauthorized practice has also been influenced by a desire
to limit competition. In carving out a set of certain activities for sale by
lawyers only, the legal profession protects not only the public but also its
monopoly over legal services.
Over the last several decades, the most prominent issue related to the
unauthorized practice of law in Canada has been the issue of paralegals
providing legal services to the public. Paralegal regulation was thrust into
the spotlight in Ontario in 1987 with the Court of Appeal's decision in R v.
Lawrie and Pointts,143 which involved an appeal of a private prosecution
initiated by the Law Society of Upper Canada against a retired police
officer who had set up a company to represent persons charged with traffic
offences. In the course of concluding that the applicable legislation did not
prohibit the practice, Blair J, who wrote for the court, stated: "[i]t has been
observed many times that the prohibition against the unauthorized practice
of law is not merely to protect qualified lawyers from infringement of
their right to practise their profession. Its primary purpose is to protect the
public." 44 This was not the result that the Law Society had hoped for. Just
prior to the decision in Pointts, the Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper
Canada "promised his colleagues that the law society would 'prosecute
the hell' out of independent paralegals." 45 After the decision, the Law
Society's response was more moderate, but still chilly, deciding "that
although it had to accept the existence of independent paralegal services,
it would take no part in their regulation and would continue to oppose their
expansion." 46 Following her study of paralegals several years later, Paula
141. Competition Bureau of Canada, supra note 32 at 72.
142. See, e.g., Donalee Moulton, "Law societies' advertising rules inhibit competition," The Lawyers
Weekly 28:9 (27 June 2008). See, also, the summary of post-2007 reforms as found in Kim AlexanderCook, "Advertising, Competition and Restraint of Trade" in Adam M Dodek & Jeffrey G Hoskins,
eds, CanadianLegal Practice, loose-leaf (consulted on 20 May 2012) (Markham: LexisNexis Canada,
2009), ch 5 at 5-5.
143. R v Lawrie and Pointts (1987), 59 OR (2d) 161 (CA) [Pointts].
144. Ibidatpara2l.

145. Paula Pevato, "Should Law Societies 'Prosecute the Hell' out of Independent Paralegal Firms"
(1991) 7 JL& Soc Pol'y 215 at 215.
146. Moore, supra note 28 at 317.
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Pevato observed that there was "substantial evidence... suggest[ing] that
the legal profession's hostility toward paralegals is motivated, to a large
degree, by a self-serving desire to maintain a monopoly over the delivery
of legal services to the public."14
Although the Ontario government commissioned a report and drafted
legislation to address the status of paralegals, no legislative reform
occurred until after the Ontario Court of Appeal raised the matter again
in 1999 and explicitly chastised the government for failing to take any
action to regulate paralegals.14 8 Further study followed which ultimately
led to legislation, effective 1 May 2007, giving the Law Society of Upper
Canada the authority to regulate paralegals. 4 9
The issue of non-lawyers providing legal services has also garnered
attention at the federal level in recent years in the immigration context. In
5 ' the Law Society of British
Law Society (British Columbia) v. Mangat,"
Columbia sought to enjoin immigration consultants from acting in relation
to immigration proceedings on the basis that this was the unauthorized
practice of law. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the Law Society's
application, finding, among other things, that federal legislation permitting
this practice trumped any provincial legislation to the contrary. Following
Mangat, the federal government enacted regulations and designated a
private corporation to govern immigration consultants. The Law Society
of Upper Canada soon challenged these developments on a number of
grounds, including that the regulations violated the rule of law because
they interfered with the independence of the bar and exceeded the
government's authority. 51 The Federal Court dismissed the application
15 2
and the dismissal was subsequently upheld on appeal.
In the cases of Ontario paralegals and federal immigration consultants,
the courts opened up the practice of law to non-lawyers in the face of
strenuous objection by law societies. In both cases, this set the stage for
legislative reform that further entrenched and legitimized non-lawyers
providing services to the public that lawyers had wanted to reserve

147. Pevato, supra note 145 at 248.
148. Ibid.

149. For a more detailed summary of these events, see Julia Bass & Paul Jonathan Saquil, "The
Authorized Provision of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers: Paralegals and Others" in Adam M Dodek
& Jeffrey G Hoskins eds, CanadianLegalPractice,loose-leaf (consulted on 20 May 2012) (Markham:
LexisNexis Canada, 2009), ch 13 at 13-2-13-12.
150. Law Society (British Columbia) vMangat,2001 SCC 67, [2001] 3 SCR 113 [Mangat].
151. Law Society of Upper Canada v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC
1489, [2007] 4 FCR 132.
152. Law Society of Upper Canadav Canada (Ministerof Citizenship andImmigration), 2008 FCA
243, [2009] 2 FCR 466, leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 2008 CanLIl 65720 (SCC).
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for themselves. Although the legal profession eventually took its own
measures-take, for example, the Law Society of Upper Canada's
ultimate embrace of regulating paralegals-this only came after courts
and governments already took forceful steps in favour of liberalizing the
market for legal services.
c. Fees
In addition to being involved in decisions about who may practice law and
how they may promote their practice, courts have also been a powerful
force in regulating how much lawyers may charge for their services. Due
to various imperfections in the market for legal services-including,
for example, informational asymmetry and the monopoly that lawyers
exercise over the provision of legal services-the risk for price inflation
and escalation is considered to be high when it comes to lawyers as a
collective professional group.153 One check on this risk has been the longrecognized inherent jurisdiction of Canadian courts to supervise the fees
that lawyers charge to clients.154 In practice, however, the use of this
inherent judicial power has been generally supplanted by formal statutory
processes that allow clients to have their lawyers' accounts reviewed by
non-judicial assessment officers or court registrars.155
In addition to hearing appeals of non-judicial reviews of costs, courts
have also taken an active role in rejecting anti-competitive fee practices
of lawyers. Set fee schedules, in particular, have been a particular target.
Despite lacking any statutory basis, fee schedules that directed lawyers
what to charge for certain services were once common in Ontario.156 In
the mid-1980s, the Competition Bureau set its sights on fee schedules put
in place by two county law associations in Ontario, the Waterloo Law
Association and the Kent County LawAssociation, that related to residential
153. For further discussion on this point, see, e.g., Alice Woolley, "Imperfect Duty: Lawyers'
Obligation to Foster Access to Justice" (2007) 45:5 Alta L Rev 107; and Gillian Hadfield, "The Price
of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System" (2000) 98 MichL Rev 953.
154. See, e.g., Glanc v 0 'Donohue & 0 'Donohue,2008 ONCA 395, 90 OR (3d) 309.

155. In Ontario, for example, this process is conducted by "assessment officers" appointed pursuant
to the Courts ofJustice Act, RSO 1990, c C 43, s 90. Similarly, in British Columbia, registrars of the
British Columbia Superior Court are tasked with this work pursuant to the Legal Profession Act, SBC
1998, c 9, Part 8; and in Alberta, a "review officer" does this work (AlbertaRules of Court,Alta Reg
124/2010, s 10.9). One major exception to this general delegation of supervision over fees is in the
area of class proceedings, where class counsel fees must be reviewed by the court in every case. For
further discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Kirk M Baert & Jonathan Bida, "Fee Approval Hearings
in Class Proceedings," online: Koskie Minsky LLP <http://www.kmlaw.ca/site documents/Fee / 20
Approval%20Hearings%2 0 -%20Class % 2 0Proceedings 18junlO.pdf>.
156. See, e.g., William P McKeown, "How the Conspiracy Provisions of the New Competition Law
Affect the Professions and Services" (1977) 2 Can Bus LJ 4 at 21, reporting that, at the time, almost
all counties in Ontario had "a solicitor's conveyancing and general tariff or a suggested fee schedule
for solicitors."
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real estate legal services and involved sanctions for non-adherence.157 The
Waterloo Law Association initially responded to the investigation initiated
by the Competition Bureau by seeking, among other things, a declaration
from the Ontario Superior Court that the Competition Act did not apply
to its activities.158 Justice Eberle, who heard the matter, ultimately took
the position that the application was premature given that no charges had
yet been laid under the Competition Act. It was clear, however, that he
rejected the proposition that lawyers enjoyed a complete exemption from
the operations of the Competition Act:
The fact that governance of the legal profession and of its members is
within the provincial legislative domain, under property and civil rights,
does not remove lawyers from the reach of a valid criminal law. For
example, a lawyer is subject to criminal prosecution if he commits
murder or theft, or any other crime. This remains the case even where,
as here, the province has delegated governing powers over the legal
profession to a provincial law society.'59
Ultimately, in 1988, both the Waterloo and Kent County law associations
consented to the issuance of court orders of prohibition which, among
other things, prohibited them from promulgating any schedule of fees for
legal services and mandated certain reporting requirements for a five-year
period. 60 Although the court orders issued only related to small groups
of lawyers in Ontario, these tariff cases stand as yet another example of
courts rejecting exceptional treatment for the legal profession and ousting
self-serving measures in favour of the public interest.

157. R v Waterloo Law Assn (1988), 21 CPR (3d) 528 (ON H Ct J) [R v Waterloo];R v Kent County
Law Assn, [1988] OJ No 2965 (ON H Ct J) [R v Kent County]. For a summary of the cases, see

also Calvin S Goldman, Director of Investigation and Research, Bureau of Competiton Policy, "The
CompetitionAct and the Professions" (Notes for an Address by Calvin S Goldman, to the Canadian
Bar Association (Ontario) Program on the Professions, Toronto, Ontario, 25 April 1989), online:
Competition Bureau <htp://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01128.html>.
158. Waterloo Law Association v Canada (Attorney General) (1986), 58 OR (2d) 275 (H Ct J). As

reported at paragraph 18 of the decision: "Although the Law Society [of Upper Canada] was notified
of the proceedings and appeared for the argument of the applications, it [was] not a party to either
proceeding and took no position."
159. Ibid at para 20. It should also be noted that Justice Eberle did qualify this passage somewhat in

the next paragraph, acknowledging
[t]hat a lawyer or law association ought to be able to claim an exemption, in appropriate
circumstances, in answer to a prosecution under the Competition Act, where the activities
which give rise to the prosecution are activities required by the governing body of the
profession acting withinpowers delegated to itby a valid provincial statute. I recognize also
that it may be sufficient if the activities are merely authorized, and not actually required.
160. R v Law Waterloo, supra note 157; R v Kent County, supra note 157.
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3. Conduct rules
As seen in the above examples, during the 1970s and 1980s, the courts
were active in rejecting various anti-competitive restrictions on entry,
advertising, and fees. In the 1990s, judicial review of conduct rules
applying to the profession led to important regulatory changes. Most
significantly, judges acted to regulate in the areas of conflicts of interest
and withdrawal from the record. In both cases, the standards established
by the courts placed a greater emphasis on the public interest than the
standards contemporaneously favoured by the profession itself.
a. Conflicts of interest
Broadly speaking, conflict of interest rules for lawyers operate to regulate
the risk that a lawyer's representation of a client "would be materially and
adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties
'
to another current client, a former client, or a third person."161
Conflict of
interest rules relate to a lawyer's ethical duties-for example, the duties
of loyalty and confidentiality-but can also engage a lawyer's economic
interests. Simply put, if a lawyer is prevented from acting for a client as a
result of a deemed conflict, the lawyer loses the client and all associated
fees. In general, Canadian courts adjudicate on conflicts of interest in the
course of exercising their inherent jurisdiction over the court's processes
and in administering civil actions for breach of fiduciary duty.
Conflicts of interest gained a new prominence in Canada in the last
several decades as a result of a trilogy of Supreme Court of Canada
decisions.162 In the first case that "ignited the conflicts revolution in
Canada," 63 Martin v. Gray,64 the issue was whether the law firm
representing the defendant was precluded from continuing to act because
an associate who had previously assisted in representing the plaintiff at
another firm was now working at the defendant's firm. In considering
whether an impermissible conflict arose, the majority held that courts must
consider to the "possibility of real mischief' with respect to the misuse
of confidential information by a lawyer against a former client rather
161. This definition of a "conflict" is found in American Law Institute, Restatement ofthe Law, Third:
The Law Governing Lawyers, vol 2 (St Paul, MN: American Law Institute, 2000) at 244-245 and was
cited with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada inR v Neil, 2002 SCC 70 at para 31, [2002] 3
SCR 631 [R vNeil].
162. The analysis in this section has greatly benefited from the careful parsing of these cases by other
scholars and lawyers, including most notably, Adam Dodek (see, e.g. Adam M Dodek, "Conflicted
Identities: The Battle over the Duty of Loyalty in Canada" (2011) 14:2 Legal Ethics 193) and Simon
Chester (see, e.g. Simon Chester, The Conflicts Revolution: Martin V Gray and Fifteen Years of

Change (Heenan Blaikie LLP, 2006)).
163. Chester, supra note 162 at 14 [footnote omitted].
164. Martin v Gray, [1990] 3 SCR 1235.
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than a lower standard that would only require the "probability of real
mischief"16 5 Writing for the majority, Sopinka J rejected the proposition
that the realities of the modem practice of law-the rise of the large firm,
mergers, and the more regular movement of lawyers between firmsshould lead to a "slackening" of the conflicts of interests rule.166
As Adam Dodek has observed, the majority reasons in Martin v.
Gray may be read as deferential to the legal profession. 6 ' Justice Sopkina
acknowledges, for example, that lawyers are a self-governing profession
and the courts should consider an expression of a standard in codes of
professional conduct to be, although not binding on the courts, "an
important statement of public policy." '68 He also suggests that the Canadian
Bar Association should take the lead in determining whether institutional
screening devices "such as Chinese walls and cones of silence" might be
effective in shielding against a transferee lawyer "tainting" his or her new
law firm and in developing national standards for using such devices. 69
Notwithstanding the deference shown, the immediate reaction of
the Canadian legal profession to Martin v. Gray was intense and the
decision "sent shockwaves through the Canadian legal profession." ' °
In response to the Court's invitation, the Canadian Bar Association set
up a Task Force that produced a report setting out guidelines to assist in
"screening" transferring lawyers to avoid disqualification in cases where
the transferring lawyer has received confidential information attributable
to a solicitor-client relationship while working at his or her former firm
that would put him or her in a position of conflict at the new firm." 1 The
recommendations set out in the report were, in general, endorsed by the
profession and found their way into governing codes of conduct." 2
Roughly a decade later, the Supreme Court of Canada decided another
major conflict case. In R. v. Neil, the court considered the question of duties

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Ibid at para 47.
Ibid.
Dodek, supra note 162 at 202.
Martin v Gray, [1990] 3 SCR 1235 at para 21.
Ibidat para 51.

170. Dodek, supra note 162 at 201. See also, Cristin Schmitz, "S.C.C. creates tough new conflict of
interest standards," The Lawyers Weekly 10:34 (18 January 1991). It should be noted that the minority

decision, authored by Justice Cory, advocated for an even stricter duty that would see an irrebutable
inference that the knowledge of one member of a law firm constitutes knowledge of all members of the
firm and rejected the suggestion that institutional devices might provide appropriate safeguards. This
stricter test, argued the minority, was necessary to preserve public confidence in the administration of
justice.
171. CanadianBar AssociationTask Force on Conflict of Interest, Conflicts oflnterestDisqualification:
Martin v Gray and ScreeningMethods (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1993).
172. Dodek, supra note 167 at 201.
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owed to concurrent clients, rather than that of duties owed to former clients
that was raised in Martin v Gray. Justice Binnie, writing for a unanimous
court, characterized the central issue on appeal as follows: "What are the
proper limits of a lawyer's 'duty of loyalty' to a current client in a case
where the lawyer did not receive any confidential information that was (or
is) relevant to the matter in which he proposes to act against the client's
current interest?""1 3 The Court adopted a "bright-line" rule which dictated
that
a lawyer may not represent one client whose interests are directly
adverse to the immediate interests of another current client-even ifthe
two mandates are unrelated-unlessboth clients consent after receiving
full disclosure (and preferably independent legal advice), and the lawyer
reasonably believes that he or she is able to represent each client without
adversely affecting the other.'
In arriving at this rule, the Court leaned on the notion that strict rules
regarding conflicts of interest were necessary to ensure that the public
maintained confidence in the legal system."7 5 The impact of Neil was even
more intense than that of Martin v. Gray: "[i]f Martin v Gray was an
earthquake, Neil was treated more like a tsunami threatening Canadian
legal practice.""7 6
Several years later, the Supreme Court of Canada once again addressed
the issue of a duty of loyalty in 3464920 CanadaInc. v. Strother."' In this
case, the Court considered the situation of a lawyer (Strother) who had,
among other things, obtained a substantial and direct financial interest
in a client (Sentinel) in competition with another client (Monarch). The
majority decision found that Strother had breached his fiduciary duty to
Monarch by accepting a personal interest in Sentinel.7 ' As summarized by
Binnie J: "Strother could not with equal loyalty serve Monarch and pursue
his own financial interest which stood in obvious conflict with Monarch

173. R v Neil, supra note 161 at para 1.

174. Ibid at para 29 [emphasis in the original].
175.
176.
177.
178.

Ibid at para 12.
Dodek, supra note 162 at 203 [footnote omitted].
3464920 CanadaInc v Strother, 2007 SCC 24, [2007] 2 SCR 177 [Strother].
As stated at ibid, paragraph 67:

By acquiring a substantial and direct financial interest in one client (Sentinel) seeking to
enter a very restricted market related to film production services in which another client
(Monarch) previously had a major presence, Strother put his personal financial interest into
conflict with his duty to Monarch The conflict compromised Strother's duty to 'zealously'
represent Monarch's interests (Neil, at para. 19), a delinquency compounded by his lack of
Icandour' with Monarch 'on matters relevant to the retainer' (ibid), i.e. his own competing
financial interest.
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making a quick re-entry into the tax-assisted film financing business. "179
The minority decision by McLachlin CJ took a different view, beginning
from the premise that the duty of loyalty owed to a client must be informed
by the content of the contractual retainer. Given the fact that, at the time
of Strother's investment he was under a new retainer with Monarch that
provided he was only to provide advice when specifically asked and was
free to act for competitors, the minority decision found that "there is
no reason to conclude that Strother's capacity to loyally and zealously
perform the very limited duties to Monarch under the 1998 oral retainer
would be affected by his taking a personal interest in Sentinel Hill." 8
One way to understand the majority and minority decisions in Strother
is as a disagreement about whether, in a solicitor-client relationship,
fiduciary duties overlay the contractual terms found in the retainer or vice
versa."18 In taking the former view, the majority decision opted to impose
a more robust duty of loyalty on Canadian lawyers. As noted by Harvey
Morrison, "[i]f there were any hopes that the Supreme Court of Canada
would moderate the rigour of the bright line rule in Neil, they were dashed
1 2 The bright-line test, or the
in Strother."
"unrelated matters rule" affirmed
in both of these cases gave conflicts of interest rules a broad mandate of
application.
Following the decisions of Neil and Strother, the Canadian Bar
Association reacted defensively, establishing another task force that
produced a "surprisingly confrontational" report that argued that the brightline rule set out by the Supreme Court of Canada "is obiter, unreasoned,
overly broad and contrary to the public interest." 8 3 Equally surprising,
perhaps, were the extra-judicial comments from a sitting Supreme Court
of Canada justice about the report. In a speech delivered at a conference
in Strasbourg, France, Justice Binnie directly confronted the content of
the CBA task force report, emphasizing the need to "enhance the public
trust" in the legal profession and the important role of more, not less, strict
conflicts rules. 8 4 Indeed, the title of the speech "Sondage apr~s sondage"
179. Ibid at para 70.
180. Ibid at para 145.
181. Dodek, supra note 162 at 205. See, also, Anthony Duggan, "Solicitors' Conflict of Interest and
the Wider Fiduciary Question" (2007) 45:3 Can Bus U 414 at 417-420.
182. Harvey L Morrison, "Conflicts of Interest and the Concept of Loyalty" (2008) 87:3 Can Bar Rev
565 at 578.
183. Alice Woolley, "Correspondent's Report from Canada: Task Force on Conflicts of Interest"
(2009) 12:1 Legal Ethics 87 at 87.
184. Ian Binnie, "Sondage apres sondage ... quelques reflexions sur les conflits d'interets" ("Poll After
Poll: A Few Thoughts about Conflicts of Interest") edited version of a speech given at Les Journes
Strasbourgeoises,Strasbourg, France (4 July 2008). For further discussion of this incident, see Dodek,
supra note 162 at 209-211.

520

The Dalhousie Law Journal

(Poll after Poll) was a direct reference to a recent speech given by the
former president of the Quebec Bar in which he referenced the fact that
lawyers find themselves poorly ranked (alongside politicians and used car
dealers) in surveys regarding the public confidence in the legal profession.
In view of this back and forth and these unusual extra-judicial comments,
it might be fairly said, as Adam Dodek has previously, that "[t]he tension
between judicial regulation and self-regulation is perhaps most evident in
the area of conflicts of interest."185
Most recently, in the 2013 case of CanadianNationalRailway Co. v.

McKercherLLP,186 the Supreme Court of Canada once again considered the
issue of lawyer conflicts. This case involved a large firm in Saskatchewan,
McKercher LLP, that had accepted a retainer to act against the Canadian
National Railway Company in a class action lawsuit notwithstanding the
fact that it was acting for CN on a variety of unrelated matters. CN only
learned of McKercher's involvement in the class action matter once it
was served with a statement of claim. In the month before serving the
statement of claim and in the days following service, the firm terminated
its existing retainers with CN, except for a retainer on one file which
CN itself terminated. CN applied for an order removing McKercher as
solicitor of record for the plaintiff in the class action against it. Writing
for a unanimous court, McLachlin CJC concluded, among other things,
that the situation "fell squarely within the scope of the bright line rule"18
and remitted the matter back to the lower court for redetermination in
accordance with the Court's reasons. In terms of the development of the
law of conflicts, the Court inMcKercherreaffirmed the bright line rule set
out in Neil and clarified its scope.188
For the purposes of this article, Chief Justice McLachlin's comments
at paragraph 16 of the decision are perhaps the most interesting wherein
she writes:
[16] Both the courts and law societies are involved in resolving issues
relating to conflicts of interest-the courts from the perspective of the
proper administration of justice, the law societies from the perspective
of good governance of the profession: see R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC
10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331. In exercising their respective powers, each may
properly have regard for the other's views. Yet each must discharge its
185. Dodek,supra note 162 at 195.
186. 2013 SCC 39.
187. Ibid atpara. 8.

188. Specifically, the Court clarified that: (1) the rule applies where the immediate legal interests of
clients are directly adverse; (2) it does not apply to condone tactical abuses; and (3) it does not apply in
circumstance where it is unreasonable to expect that the lawyer will not concurrently represent adverse
parties in unrelated legal matters (ibid at para 32).
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unique role. Law societies are not prevented from adopting stricter rles
than those applied by the courts in their supervisory role. Nor are courts
in their supervisory role bound by the letter of law society rules, although
"an expression of a professional standard in a code of ethics.., should be
considered an important statement of public policy": Martin, at p. 1246.
Although the above suggests a co-operative relationship between
the courts and the law societies, and distinct roles for each, it fails to
acknowledge that both institutions are, in fact, regulating precisely the
same area oflawyer conduct (albeit for different ends) and that the judiciary,
beginning with Martin v. Gray in 1990, has inserted itself as a regulator in
this area in an unprecedented fashion which has led to significant changes
in how conflict of interests are regulated not only by the courts but also
by law society rules. Moreover, the positions taken by the Court have
resulted in greater regulation in this area and, in some cases, been in direct
opposition to the positions taken by the legal profession.189
b. Withdrawal
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada again waded into the area of
lawyer conduct in considering the circumstances under which lawyers
190
should be permitted to withdraw from the record. In R v. Cunningham,
a unanimous Supreme Court confirmed that courts have the authority to
mandate that counsel continue to represent an accused in circumstances
where counsel wishes to withdraw because of non-payment of legal fees,
although this authority "must be exercised sparingly, and only when
necessary to prevent serious harm to the administration of justice." 191
The decision also confirmed that the authority to refuse an application
for withdrawal did not extend to circumstances where withdrawal was
sought for an ethical reason: in such cases "the court must grant [the]
withdrawal." 192 Although at the time this case was heard, the majority of
provincial and territorial appellate courts held that courts had jurisdiction
to prevent defence counsel from withdrawing due to non-payment in fees,
there was some division in the case law and differing approaches had been

189. In the case of lawyer conflicts of interests, it is important to note that the legal profession has
not spoken with one voice. Although the CBA has been critical of the bright line rule, the Federation
of Law Societies has aligned itself with the Supreme Court jurisprudence. For further discussion, see
Dodek, "Conflicted Identities," supra note 162 at 211-213 and see, also, Alice Woolley, "Problem
solved? Assessing the Supreme Court's Latest Statement on the Law Governing Conflicts of Interest"
Ablawg.ca, 2 August 2013, online: <http://ablawg.ca/2013/08/02/problem-solved-assessing-thesupreme-courts-latest-statement-on-the-law-governing-conflicts-of-interest/>.
190. R v Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 SCR 331 [Cunningham].
191. Ibidatpara 1.
192. Ibid at para 49.
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taken in the codes of conduct established by provincial law societies.193 In
clarifying the law, Cunningham generated some bold headlines.194
In Cunningham, the Court again had the opportunity to discuss
the relationship between the judicial regulation of lawyers and the role
of self-governing bodies. The Court of Appeal for Yukon had held that
the court had no jurisdiction to refuse a withdrawal for non-payment of
fees, in part, because the legal profession is self-governing and that the
provincial and territorial law societies have primary responsibility over
lawyer regulation.195 The Yukon appeals court expressed concern that "the
potential for an unseemly conflict would exist if the court took one view of
'
a lawyer's conduct in withdrawing, and the Law Society took another."196
The Supreme Court of Canada considered this issue, but ultimately found
that this tension did not preclude the courts from exercising jurisdiction,
commenting that
[t]he law societies play an essential role in disciplining lawyers for
unprofessional conduct; however, the purpose of the court overseeing
withdrawal is not disciplinary. The court's authority is preventativeto protect the administration of justice and ensure trial fairness. The
disciplinary role of the law society is reactive. Both roles are necessary
to ensure effective
regulation of the profession and protect the process
97
of the court.'
Despite the Court's evocation of complementary roles for the law societies
and courts in this area, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Supreme
Court of Canada in R v. Cunningham issued a judicial trump card in
the area of lawyer withdrawal. Even where ethics rules promulgated by
law societies allow for withdrawal for non-payment of fees, a court has
the power to refuse to allow the lawyer to withdraw. Although, as the
Court indicated, this power is to be used only "sparingly," its impact is
tremendously significant: a lawyer can be forced to act for a client, for free,
against the lawyer's wishes. In a narrow set of cases, therefore, courts have
been given the power to exercise a powerful form of lawyer regulation.

193. Annalise Acorn, "Jumping Ship: R v Cunningham and the Lawyer's Right to Withdraw" (2011)
44 UBC L Rev 381 at 381-383.
194. See, e.g., Cristin Schmitz, "Courts can order lawyers to work for free," The Lawyers Weekly
29:45 (9 April 2010); and Janice Tibbetts, "Lawyers can't dump deadbeat clients, top court rules,"
CanwestNews Service 13:776 (26 March 2010).
195. CunninghamvLilles, 2008 YKCA 7, 59 CR (6th) 49.
196. Ibid at para 25.
197. Supra note 190 at para 35 [emphasis in the original].
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4. Judges and entry restrictions,post-entry limits on competition and
conduct rules
In adjudicating disputes in the areas of entry restrictions, post-entry limits
on competition, and post-entry conduct rules, the judiciary has repeatedly
taken measures to promote the public interest and has often rejected
self-serving standards favoured by the legal profession. Although the
above account outlines a number of laudable measures taken by the legal
profession to, for example, liberalize entry restrictions and rules relating
to advertising and unauthorized practice of law, these measures have often
only come after considerable resistance and court intervention.
Before these judicial measures can be fairly classified as amounting
to a regime of aggressive judicial co-regulation, however, it is again
necessary to address several possible objections. First, it may fairly be
pointed out that the judicial record in these areas has been mixed. Initial
efforts to invalidate citizenship requirements, for example, were rebuffed
by the courts. The Supreme Court of Canada also originally upheld the
advertising restrictions imposed by the Law Society of British Columbia.
Moreover, not all appellate courts have limited efforts by law societies
to exclude paralegals or non-Canadian lawyers from providing legal
services.19 These examples require an acknowledgement that the judicial
regulation of lawyers has not always immediately or straightforwardly
favoured the public interest at the expense of lawyers' narrow self-interest.
However, in each of the above areas-entry restrictions, advertising and
paralegals-the courts did ultimately inspire, if not dictate, significant
change: citizenship requirements were ultimately deemed invalid by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews, advertising restrictions
were liberalized in the context of a series of post-Charter cases finding
freedom of expression protections applied to commercial speech and
professional advertising, and paralegal regulation has been reviewed
in provinces across Canada following the courts' attention to the issue.
In short, the courts have had a meaningful impact in mitigating abuses
of self-regulatory powers: unnecessary entry restrictions and limits on
competition have been judicially rejected, leading to reforms which have
resulted in a regulatory environment more attentive to the public interest.
Moreover, the chronology outlined in this Part suggests that courts have
become more and more bold in confronting the profession's self-serving
standards as the decades have progressed.
Second, one might object to the argument that aggressive judicial
regulation has occurred in light of the reliance of courts on legislative
198. See, e.g., Lameman vAlberta, 2012 ABCA 59, 522 AR 140.
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developments in their regulatory activity: specifically, amendments to
federal competition legislation and the introduction of the Canadian
CharterofRights and Freedoms. Except for the developments in conflicts
of interest and withdrawal rules, it is difficult to see how the courts would
have taken many of the measures described in this Part without these
statutory tools. To be sure, this observation reveals the limited nature of
judicial regulation. The power of the courts to regulate the legal profession
is not "at-large" but arises in relation to common law rights of action,
statutory provisions, and the courts' inherent jurisdiction. The above
account does reveal, however, that the courts have used the tools provided
to them-however limited-to regulate the legal profession in the public
interest. The reforms that have resulted are significant, both collectively
and individually.
Conclusion
When contrasted with the major changes in lawyer regulation that have
occurred in other jurisdictions, the Canadian regulatory environment
appears to be fairly calm. Provincial and territorial law societies continue
to operate largely independently of the legislative and executive branches
of government. Moreover, the law societies have maintained governing
authority in core regulatory areas. As this article has demonstrated,
however, it is a mistake to move from these observations to a conclusion
that there has been an absence of either critique or change with respect to
how the legal profession is regulated in Canada. The last several decades
have witnessed significant changes, and courts have been at the forefront
of many of the reforms that have occurred. As a result of the judicial
measures described in Parts III and IV, above, a Canadian lawyer today
faces a radically different regulatory regime than he or she would have in
the early 1970s.1 99

The developments outlined in this article can also be understood in
terms oftheir impact on core regulatory areas constitutive of self-regulation.
Exerting control over entry, competence, competition and conduct is, at its
heart, what it means for a profession to be self-regulating. A close look at
the last few decades of lawyer regulation in Canada reveals that judges
have taken significant measures in each of these areas. Although it remains

199. It should be noted that one area largely unexplored in this article is the judicial regulation of
lawyers in the criminal law domain (for example, the courts' treatment of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims made against criminal defence counsel and/or abuse of process or malicious
prosecution claims against Crown counsel). This is an area ripe for further investigation and, indeed,
another Canadian legal ethics scholar, Micah Rankin, has begun work in this area and is drafting an
article on the topic of "The Court's Role in Regulating Lawyers in Criminal Proceedings."
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accurate to call the Canadian legal profession self-regulating given the
legislative delegated authority afforded to the provincial and territorial law
societies, the observations in this article highlight an important way in
which these self-regulatory powers are significantly attenuated. Further,
given the ways in which the judicial activity in these core regulatory
areas may be seen as acting to mitigate risks associated with delegated
governance authority-in particular, unnecessary entrance restrictions,
insufficiently zealous monitoring of post-entry competence, unnecessary
constraints on post-entry forms of consumer enhancing behaviour and
adoption of conduct rules that unduly favour the commercial interests
of the profession-the judicial measures canvassed here can, overall,
be understood as furthering the public interest. These observations, it is
submitted, reveal two important things: first, judicial regulation of lawyers
in Canada has been a good thing; and, two, we need not be so suspicious
of judges as regulators of the lawyers. The proposition that the judiciary
is inherently and inevitably biased towards protecting the self-interest of
lawyers simply does not hold in the Canadian context.
Recognizing the reality and nature of aggressive judicial regulation
may also help to break through some of the inertia around beginning a
serious conversation about reforming lawyer regulation in Canada. Our
conversations to date about this issue have too often become muddled by
efforts to justify the status quo self-regulation in Canada with normative
statements about the value of an independent bar, which in turn are
understood as requiring that lawyer regulation needs to be free from any
and all external influences.2"' The account of judicial regulation in this
article demonstrates that external regulation can be avery positive influence
on lawyer regulation or, stated more negatively, that the legal profession
sometimes needs a push or to be overruled from the outside in order to
ensure a regulatory environment more attuned to the public interest. The
contribution here is modest in the sense that it does not purport to provide
an outline as to the nature and scope of external regulation that is ideal
vis-a-vis the Canadian legal profession. The claim is not that judges are
perfect regulators of the legal profession or that self-regulation should be
supplanted by a regime of total judicial regulation. The analysis here does,
however, seriously undermine any arguments that external regulation,
as a general rule, should be off the table and will hopefully encourage a
200. Take for example, the Final Report to Convocation of the Law Society of Upper Canada Task
Force on Independence that states that the independence of the bar requires, in part, that lawyers
"remain free of external manipulation, state interference or ulterior influence in performing his or her
duties" (23 November 2006) at 11, online: The Law Society of Upper Canada <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/
media/convnov2306 taskforce.pdf>.
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more open discussion about how external actors can help regulate the legal
profession in a beneficial manner.
Going forward, this account can also assist in inspiring more creative
discussion about what possible future reforms might improve lawyer
regulation in Canada. When it is talked about, the issue of reforming
the regulation of lawyers in Canada is often presented as a blunt choice
between self-regulation and governmental regulation. The fact that judges
have played a positive role in the past several decades of Canadian lawyer
regulation suggests that our discussions about potential models of lawyer
regulation ought to become more nuanced to include an acknowledgment
and consideration of the role that the judiciary may play. In England and
Wales, for example, where there has been arguably the most significant
move away from self-regulation, legislative reforms have specifically
allocated new regulatory roles for the judiciary in reviewing and, if
necessary, enforcing directions made by new independent governmental
bodies.2" 1 At the very least, in order to be useful, any discussion about
what changes to professional regulation are required or predictions about
how certain changes may reform the regulatory environment needs solid
grounding in a complete picture of the capacities and tendencies of the
current regulatory actors.
The account of judicial regulation of the Canadian legal profession
provided here by no means ends questions about the future of lawyer
regulation in Canada. One hopes it works, however, to better inform our
responses to them. An understanding of the history and the complexities of
the current regulatory environment governing Canadian lawyers opens up
the possibility of a more thoughtful and creative dialogue about the future
shape of this environment. Such thoughtfulness and creativity is surely
needed if the Canadian legal profession is going to carve out a meaningful
place for itself in the coming years as it faces new challenges brought on by
increased commercialization, globalization and technological automation
of legal services.

201. Legal Services Act 2007 (UK), c 29.

